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Spyware is a big threat, posing severe privacy and security issues. The best way to 
eliminate spyware, and thus reduce the threat, is to adopt anti-spyware programs. 
While previous studies identified various determinants of anti-spyware adoption, 
some factors have not been examined. Based on the theory of reasoned action, the 
theory of planned behavior, and the technology acceptance model, this study 
attempted to indentify why users adopt anti-spyware programs and examined 
causal relationships between the following variables: general technology 
familiarity, knowledge of spyware, perceived risk of spyware, and trust of anti-
spyware programs. This study also divided general technology familiarity into 
computer, Internet, and security familiarity. Lastly, differences between U.S. and 
South Korea were identified. Based on research objectives, this study proposed 11 
hypotheses and empirically tested them by using confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA}, structural equation modeling (SEM), and analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA). After hypotheses testing, this study found that general technology 
familiarity does not significantly influence intention of adoption. However, 
computer and security familiarity were important predictors of knowledge of 
spyware; and Internet familiarity was a determinant of perceived risk and trust in 
the U.S. and South Korea. Significant differences were found between the U.S. 
and South Korea with regard to how computer familiarity, familiarity, security 
familiarity, knowledge of spyware, perceived risk of spyware, trust of anti-
spyware programs, and intention to adopt anti-spyware programs are perceived. 
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Malware is software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system without 
the user's consent. It includes viruses, spyware, and spam. This study examines an 
anti-spyware program adoption model that extends previous studies of technology 
acceptance. This first chapter addresses the statement of problem, purpose of the 
study, definition ofspyware, significance of the study, delimitation ofthe study, 
and organization of the thesis. 
1. Statement of Problem 
With the development of computer technology and the Internet, the population of 
internet users, including online shoppers, has radically increased, enabling 
companies (e.g. Amazon.com and e-bay) to obtain customer information 
efficiently. However, some complicated data collection by spyware has raised 
serious privacy and security concerns of users, companies, and developers (Zhang, 
2005). These issues emerged because spyware is secretly downloaded on a user's 
computer to control and monitor the user's behaviors. Although the original intent 
of spyware was to create software that would remain hidden from users until the 
users need to be rescued from a programming or application snag, at which time 
the software would pop up and help them solve their computer problems, it has 
become a type ofmalware (Baker, 2006). 
Spyware poses severe privacy and security issues to users of electronic 
commerce (e-commerce) and mobile commerce (m-commerce) (Shukla & Nah, 
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2005) by limiting their online activities. According to John Edwards (2001 ), 
spyware is just one of many startling examples of how people's privacy is being 
eroded. That is, obtaining private information without consent by using spyware is 
to infringe upon the users and to violate users' privacy. Also, few people or 
corporations believe spyware is beneficial to the computing experience, but this 
issue has not been well studied (Stafford & Urbaczewski, 2004). Fortunately, 
researchers and business practitioners have recently begun to pay attention to 
negative technology such as spyware (Dinev & Hu, 2007). 
According to the Economist (2004), the top three spyware firms in the U.S 
claim their software is installed on approximately 100 million PCs. Microsoft 
claims that half of all computer crashes reported by its customers were caused by 
spyware and its equivalents (Spring, 2004). Dell pronounced that spyware is 
responsible for about 12% of all tec!mical support calls and accounts for the 
biggest category of customer complaints (Asaravala, 2004). 
While normal computer users generally recognize that direct attacks by 
viruses or hackers are major threats to them, they tend not to regard spyware as an 
important issue because the threat by spyware is an indirect infiltration in the form 
of monitoring programs surreptitiously installed on computers (Gibson, 2005). 
The best way to prevent infiltration from spyware is to adopt anti-spyware 
programs. Anti-spyware programs are the most widely recommended solution; the 
programs implement features that prevent, detect, and remedy the problems 
caused by spyware (Lee & Kozar, 2008). 
According to Beith (2005), more than 100 million Internet users downloaded 
3 
Lavasoft's free anti-spyware programs. Some big companies such as Microsoft 
have also provided anti-spyware programs. Studies have identified that more than 
80% of current spyware problems could be identified and resolved by using anti-
spyware programs, and thus, security specialists strongly encourage Internet users 
to use anti-spyware programs (Lee & Kozar, 2008). According to Consumer 
Reports (2008), 33% of Internet users in their survey did not use software to block 
or remove spyware in 2007. In sum, anti-spyware programs can effectively protect 
users from spyware, and their low adoption rate creates problems for users in the 
Internet world. 
2. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to identify factors of intention to adopt anti-spyware 
programs and to examine how individuals' technology familiarity influences 
intention to adopt anti-spyware programs. This study identifies three dimensions 
of technology familiarity: computer familiarity, Internet familiarity, and security 
familiarity. Also, other factors of anti-spyware program adoption such as 
knowledge, perceived risk, and trust are examined, and their relationships are 
investigated. Lastly, this study examines whether the research model adopted in 
U.S. fits in South Korea. If any differences are identified between the cultures, the 
reasons for these differences are examined. 
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3. Definition of Spyware 
To examine anti-spyware program adoption, this study employs two terms of 
Dinev and Hu (2007) 1 : negative technologies and protective technologies. 
Negative technologies are defined as "those that are designed to disrupt or harm 
their users, such as computer viruses, spyware, and tools for breaking into systems 
and databases" (p387). On the other hand, protective technologies refers to "those 
that are designed to deter, neutralize, disable, or eliminate the negative 
technologies or their effectiveness, such as anti-virus software, anti-spyware tools, 
firewalls, and intrusion detection technologies" (p387). 
Spyware is generally defined as programs that act as data sensors and illicitly 
collect and transmit information about end users, and then send it back to a third 
party (Cohen, 2003; Kenyon, 2004). Spyware is the name given to the class of 
software that is surreptitiously installed on a user's computer and monitors a 
user's activity and reports back to a third party on that behavior (Daniels, 2004). 
As, a general class of remote monitoring applications, spyware has created 
problems so severe that network administrators consider it a greater threat than 
unsolicited email (Stafford & Urbaczewski, 2004). Also, spyware asserts control 
over a user's computer without his/her consent (Stafford & Urbaczewski, 2004). 
One of the protective technologies, anti-spyware programs are defined as the 
programs designed to detect, block, and remove spyware. Table 1-1 displays Lee 
1 Besides these two terms, the authors also present positive technologies, which 
refer to "those technologies that are designed to benefit their users in terms of 
productivity, efficiency, competitiveness, or entertainment" (p387). Positive 
technologies include office programs, ERP systems, e-commerce technologies, 
and others. 
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and Kozar's (2005) classification of spyware and their definitions. 
Table 1-1. Classification of Spyware 
Class Definition 
Adware Programs that monitor Internet users' online activities to initiate 
pop-up advertising or other targeted marketing purposes. 
Key loggers Programs that capture and record internet users' every keystroke, 
including personal information and passwords. 
Malicious programs that appear as harmless or desirable 
Trojans applications, but are designed to cause loss or theft of computer 
data, or even to destroy the system. 
Programs that alter the content of Web sites · internet users are 
Scumware accessing, changing the normal links to reroute them to other Web 
sites. 
Dialers Programs typically used by vendors serving pornography via the 
internet. 
Browser Programs that run automatically every time Internet users start their 
Hijackers Internet browser to gather information on the user's surfing habits. 
Lee & Kozar (2005) (p. 74) 
4. Significance of the Study 
This study will make a contribution to many groups including researchers, 
practitioners, and educators. While studies exist related to anti-spyware adoption 
models, most empirical studies are restricted to the U.S. Comparison between the 
U.S. and South Korea will provide additional international insight for the field. 
This study will also test and extend the existing model of anti-spyware program 
adoption. 
From a practitioner's perspective, this study will aid in the management of 
organizational Web sites by helping firms provide the Internet user with 
6 
knowledge on negative programs, such as spyware and viruses. This will reduce 
Internet users' concern and increase visitation rates. Also, an understanding of 
adoption factors by anti-spyware sites can help improve uptake. 
Contributions to educators are also expected. First, college instructors will be 
able to use the results to design relevant security courses. Second, every computer 
user is a potential victim of spyware. Suitable education about negative and 
protective technologies will reduce potential risks. 
5. Delimitations of the Study 
As with most research, this study has delimitations. First, this study considers 
acceptance of protective information technology by end users. Nowadays, 
protective information technology includes various programs, such as anti-
spyware, anti-virus, and others. However, this study is restricted to anti-spyware 
program adoption. 
Second, while spyware problems are considered in the organizational and 
interorganizational perspective as well as the individual perspective, the anti-
spyware program adoption of this study is limited to the individual perspective. 
The third delimitation is of selecting undergraduate and graduate college 
students in the U.S. and South Korea as respondents. Although this choice could 
be considered a delimitation, the use of college students as a sample for 
technology acceptance research is common and considered acceptable when the 
students intend to use the technology. Also younger people are regarded as having 
more Internet savvy than standard computer users. 
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This study also uses a convenience sample of students from only one 
university in the U.S. and one university in South Korea. The principle of 
probability sampling indicates that a sample represents the population if all 
members of the population have an equal chance of being selected in the sample 
(Babbie, 1995). The convenience sample being used lacks some 
representativeness of the wider protective technology user population. Sampling 
bias from using one university in each country studied could exist. 
6. Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 presents the scope of the study and discusses contributions, limitations 
and the organization of the study. Chapter 2 provides the reader with a relevant 
review of the literature on the technology acceptance model, and a review of 
technology familiarity, as well as other variables that influence protective 
information technology. The conceptual research model is also presented based on 
constructs derived from the literature review along with hypotheses that will be 
tested. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology for the study. Chapter 4 will 
summarize the results of the study while Chapter S will provide conclusions and 




This chapter begins by reviewing three theoretical models related to protective 
technology adoption: the theory of reasoned action, the theory of planned behavior, 
and the technology acceptance model. Next, previous empirical studies of anti-
spyware adoption are reviewed and variables of the study are discussed. The final 
section of the chapter introduces the research model and hypotheses. 
1. Theoretical Background of Protective Technology Acceptance 
In this study, the anti-spyware program adoption model is based on three theories: 
the theory of reasoned action, the planned behavior theory, and the technology 
acceptance model. This section discusses each of these three theories. Based on 
the theories, five constructs (i.e. technology familiarity, knowledge of spyware, 
perceived risk of spyware, trust of anti-spyware program, and intention to adopt 
anti-spyware program) are derived and discussed. 
(1) Theory of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior Theory 
According to the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975, p.16), 
an individual's behavior is predicted by his or her intention to perform the 
behavior. The intention is influenced by two factors: (1) attitude toward the 
behavior, a function of beliefs about consequences of the behavior, and (2) 
subjective norms concerning the behavior, a function of normative beliefs about 
the behavior. Attitude toward the behavior is an individual's positive or negative 
feelings about performing the behavior. A subjective norm is an individual's 
perception of how most people who are important to him or her think about 
whether he or she should or should not perform the behavior. 
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Extended from TRA, the planned behavior theory (PBT) is about the 
relationship between attitude and behavior. PBT has been applied to studies of the 
relations among beliefs, attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviors in 
information systems research, especially computer-related human behaviors. 
PBT is used in information systems research because it can successfully capture 
individual, social, and situational factors impacting an individual's decision 
related to the use of information systems (Ajzen, 1988). 
Because PBT has been an effective theory in explaining and predicting the 
adoption of new information technologies, it is a good base for examining the 
adoption of anti-spyware programs. In PBT, key factors in behavioral intention 
are: attitude toward the act, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control 
(Ajzen, 1988). TRA and PBT both maintain that attitude completely mediates the 
relationship between beliefs and intention. 
This study adopts the beliefs - attitudes - intention framework ofTRA and 
PBT to the spyware adoption context and incorporates other variables pertinent to 
research questions related to intention to adopt anti-spyware program. 
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(2) Technology Acceptance Model 
While some of the research on technology adoption has examined the 
organizational level (Bassellier, Benbasat, & Reich, 2003) and the 
interorganizational level (Hart & Saunders, 1997), a number of information 
systems studies have focused on how and why individuals adopt new technologies 
(Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). The current study also focuses on the 
individual level of technology adoption by using intention as a dependent variable 
(e.g. Davis, 1989). 
In response to the limitations related to TRA in predicting and explaining user 
adoption of a new technology, Davis (1989) and Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw 
(1989) developed the technology acceptance model (TAM) as an extension of 
TRA. Similar to TRA and PBT, the original TAM indicated that attitudes toward a 
new technology influence its adoption and use. TAM also attempted to explain the 
voluntary acceptance of a new technology as influenced by two beliefs: (1) the 
perceived usefulness, and (2) the perceived ease of use. The original TAM (Davis 
et al. 1989) empirically tested a partial mediation of attitude, while subsequent 
studies eliminated attitude as a predictor of technology acceptance (Venkatesh & 
Davis, 1996, 2000). Accordingly, the majority of TAM models suggest a direct 
path from perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use to behavioral intention, 
which contradicts TRA and PBT. Moreover, the Unified Theory of Acceptance 
and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model (Venkatesh et al. 2003) eliminated 
attitude by indicating that attitude will not have a direct effect on intention when 
performance and effort expectancy constructs are included in the model. UTAUT 
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considers "any observed relationship between attitude and intention to be spurious 
and resulting from omission of the other key predictors" (p.455). 
This study employs the beliefs - intention framework of TAM as well as the 
belief - attitude - intention framework of TRA and PBT in explaining and 
predicting user behavior toward anti-spyware program adoption. 
2. Empirical Findings of Previous Studies 
Several studies have been conducted to examine the technology acceptance based 
on TRA, PBT, or TAM. Based on PBT and innovation diffusion theory (IDT), 
Taylor and Todd (1995) argued that perceived usefulness, ease of use, and 
compatibility were factors of attitude and found that perceived usefulness had a 
significant effect on attitude. 
Yi, Jackson, Park, and Probst (2006) developed an integrated model by . 
incorporating IDT with the PBT and TAM for predicting personal data assistant 
(PDA) adoption by healthcare professionals. Karahanna, Straub, and Chervany 
(1999) incorporated IDT with TRA to address individuals' pre-adoption and post-
adoption belief and attitude toward Windows technology. 
Agarwal and Karahanna (2000) empirically found that users' cognitive 
absorption is posited to be a proximal antecedent of perceived usefulness and 
perceived ease of use. Figure 2-1 summarizes Agarwal and Karahanna's findings. 
















Strite and Karahanna (2006) incorporated national cultural values of 
masculinity/femininity, individualism/collectivism, power distance, and 
uncertainty avoidance into an extended model of technology acceptance as 
moderators. Figure 2-2 illustrates Strite and Karahanna's findings. 
Figure 2-2. Empirical Findings of Strite and Karahanna (2006) 
Espoused Espoused 
Masculinity/ Individualism/ 
Perceived Femininity Collectivism . - . - -' Usefulness .:. . ' • • ' • ' • ' • ' • 
T .. : ' • ' ' • ' • • ' • ' . •' • ' • .... Perceived • ! • . - ' .i. ::. • EaseofUse • .:. ••- -~ 
Subjective ~ . ... ' . Norms ' • ' - Espoused 
Espoused Uncertainty 
Power Distance Avoidance 
---Significant --------► Non-Significant 
---Results of Study I 
__ .,.. Results of Study 2 
Behavioral 
Intention to Use 
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In the context of anti-spyware adoption, combining PBT with TAM, Dinev 
and Hu (2007) empirically found the factors of intention to adopt anti-spyware 
programs. In protective technology acceptance, according to Dinev and Hu (2007), 
awareness of spyware is the key factor of intention to adopt anti-spyware 
programs. Figure 2-3 summarizes Dinev and Hu's findings. 
Figure 2-3. Empirical Findings oflntention to Adopt Anti-Spyware Programs 

















___ .._ Significant 
--------► Non-Significant 
Lee and Kozar (2008) also found determinants of adoption intention for anti-
spyware programs. They incorporated PBT, IDT, and information technology 
ethics and morality and found the determinants of intention to adopt anti-spyware 
programs. Figure 2-4 summarizes Lee and Kozar's findings. 
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In the context of online shopping, several researchers have examined 
familiarity, trust, and perceived risk as predictors of behavioral intention. Gefen, 
Karahanna, and Straub (2003) incorporated trust and TAM and found determinants 
of trust and perceived ease of use. Van Slyke, Shim, Johnson, and Jiang (2006) 
empirically found the relationship between concern for information privacy and 
trust and risk perception. Figure 2-5 displays Gefen et al. 's findings and Figure 2° 
6 illustrates Van Slyke et al. 's findings. 
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Figure 2-6. Empirical findings of Online Consumer Purchasing 
















3. Motivation for Comparison between the U.S. and South Korea 
Globalization of business has emphasized the need for understanding the 
management of organizations that span different nations and cultures, and cultural 
differences between countries can influence the effectiveness and efficiency of 
information systems deployment (Karahanna, Evaristo, & Srite, 2002). Thus, 
cross-cultural information systems research is necessary and should be developed 
further. 
'I 
The U.S. is the most developed country in IS research and development and 
South Korea is the most dynamic country in introducing and developing IS. South 
Korea is ranked first among the 30 member countries of the organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in terms of broadband access, 
and has showed rapid growth of Internet use and e-commerce. The rate of Internet 
penetration in South Korea (70.7%) is equivalent to that in the U.S. (72.5%). Both 
countries have a developed Internet infrastructure. Table 2-1 displays the 
demographic, economic and Internet-related profile of the U.S. and South Korea. 
Table 2-1. Demographic, Economic and Internet-Related Profile of the U.S. and South 
Korea 
Categories U.S. South Korea 
population1l 
303,824,646 49,232,844 (2008 est) 
White78% 
Ethnic groups2l Black 12.9% Homogeneous (Korean) Asian4.4% 
Others4.7% 
Demography Literacy2l Male: 97.0% Male: 99.2% 
(Age 15+ can Female: 97% Female: 96.6% 
read and write) Overall: 97% (1979 est.) Overall: 97.9% (2002 est.) 
Protestant 56% Buddhist 26% 
Roman Catholic 28% Protestant 19% 
Religions Jewish2% Roman Catholic 7% 
Other4% Others 2% 
none I0%2l None46%3l 
GDP per capita3l 
$45,259 $20,045 (2007) 
Economy 
GNI per capita3l 
$45,498 $20,045 (2006) 
Internet Usage 220,141,969 (2008) 34,820,000 (2008) Users'l 





Penetration 'l 59.2% (2003) 
(Internet use/ 68.8% (2004) 
Population) 68. l % (2005) 63.3% (2005) 
66.5% (2006) 
68.1 % (2007) 
72.5% (2008) 70. 7% (2008) 
Sources 
1) The Internet World Stats. http://www.intemetworldstats.com (10/6/2008) 
2) The World Factbook. http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (10/6/2008) 
3) Korean National Statistics Office. http://www.nso.go.kr (10/6/2008) 
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IS researchers have measured their research models globally and found 
differences among countries. Cultural differences among countries are the most 
widely studied factor in Internet usage. Cultural factors influence how security 
policies are formulated and implemented and also determine how a society will 
perceive computer security threats (Schmidt, Johnston, Arnett, Chen, & Li, 2008). 
Theories developed in one country have met with limited success when 
applied to other countries (Hofstede, 1993). Thus, a main question that cross-
cultural research in information systems attempts to answer is: "Why are 
successful IS theories and techniques not found to be uniformly effective across 
cultural borders?" (Karahanna, Evaristo, & Strite, 2005, p.2). 
One of the goals of the comparison between the U.S. and South Korea is to 
examine if the research model adopted in the U.S. can be successfully applied in 
other countries ( e.g. South Korea). If any differences are identified, this study will 
investigate the factors which influence the differences. 
4. Descriptions of Theoretical Variables 
(1) Adoption Intention 
19 
Since adoption intention is the most important determinant of technology 
acceptance behavior, it becomes important to examine the direct and indirect 
influences of other factors on adoption intention (Taylor & Todd, 1995). Adoption 
intention refers to an individual's motivation to exert effort to adopt a particular 
technology (e.g. anti-spyware programs). 
This study employs adoption intention rather than actual adoption behavior in 
examining determinants of anti-spyware program adoption. This is not uncommon. 
Numerous studies of technology acceptance have measured behavior intentions 
but not behaviors (Agarwal & Prasad, 1998; Karahanna et al. 1999; Venkatesh, 
1999, 2000). Prior research has also confirmed a strong correlation between 
behavioral intentions and actual behavior (Sheppard et al., 1988; Venkatesh & Davis, 
2000). The TRA and PBT described the positive relationship between behavioral 
intentions and actions. In the context of anti-spyware adoption, Lee and Kozar 
(2008) empirically found that intention to adopt anti-spyware programs is a 
predictor ofanti-spyware program adoption. 
(2) General Technology Familiarity 
Familiarity is one's understanding of an entity, often based on previous 
interactions, experience, and learning of "the what, who, how, and when of what 
is happening" (Gefen, et al. 2003, p.63). 
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Hoch and Deighton (1989) refer to familiarity as the number of product 
related experiences accumulated by the consumer. Familiarity appears to serve as 
an umbrella term and is related to other important constructs including consumer 
expertise, previous knowledge and belief, and also appears as a necessary 
condition for the development of expertise and the ability to perform product-
related tasks successfully (Ha & Perks, 2005). In turn, familiarity is a main 
predictor of trust and intention to perform the behavior (Komiak & Benbasat, 
2006; Gefen et al, 2003). The familiarity also reduces social uncertainty via 
increased understanding of what is happening in the present (Luhmann, 1979). 
This study defines general technology familiarity as one's understanding 
based on previous interaction, experience, and learning in terms of computer, 
Internet, and security. 
General technology familiarity is acquired through an individual's prior and 
direct experiential exchange with technologies related to the computer, Internet, 
and security. More general technology familiarity implies an increasing amount of 
accumulated technology knowledge derived from experience from previous 
successful interaction through the technology (Gefen, 2000). 
Based on spyware literature, anti-spyware program adoption is the nexus of 
interaction for the users among the computer, Internet, and security issues. 
Spyware causes several problems related to all these elements, including slowing 
down computer processing and internet speed, violating privacy, and other issues 
(Freeman & Urbaczewski, 2005; Awad & Fitzgerald, 2005). By examining anti-
spyware program adoption, this study divides general technology familiarity into 
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familiarity with the computer, Internet, and security. This study, therefore, tests 
general technology familiarity in a multidimensional construct (Petter, Straub, & 
Rai, 2007). Figure 2-7 illustrates the proposed dimensions of this general 
technology familiarity. The three general technology familiarity dimensions are 
discussed next. 











This study defines computer familiarity as a user's understanding of computer 
technology based on prior interactions, experiences, or knowledge. 
Potosky and Bobko (I 998) proposed a definition of computer experience 
based on the understanding of how computers are used. Potosky and Bobko 
further noted general computer experience as an integral component of general 
computer ability. They also suggested that the nature and types of experiences 
with computers are important, not just the frequency of interaction with 
programming. 
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Given the growing prevalence and reliance on computer technology, computer 
familiarity is crucial for succeeding in society (Nelson, Wiese, & Cooper, 1991). 
For decades, computers have been very important in companies, government, and 
school, and even at home; thus, computer familiarity has been studied in several 
aspects. Empirical research has examined why people differ in their levels of 
computer familiarity. 
Dambrot, Watkins-Malek, Silling, Marshall and Garver (1985) investigated 
the correlations of gender differences in attitudes toward, and involvement with, 
computers. In addition, Merchant and Sullivan (1983) found that students with 
lower GPA and math scores generally suffer more from computer phobia. 
Additionally, Rosen, Sears, and Weil (1987) indicated that women had more 
negative attitudes regarding computers than men did. They also noted that older 
students are more computer anxious than younger students, although they do not 
display more negative attitudes, cognitions, or feelings regarding computer use. 
Schulenberg, Yutrzenka, & Goham (2006) and Schulenberg and Melton (2008) 
developed and validated the instruments for computer aversion, computer attitudes, 
and computer familiarity. 
In sum, individuals have different levels of computer familiarity, and thus 
computer familiarity is a dimension of technology familiarity in anti-spyware 
program adoption. The following section introduces Internet familiarity as the 
second dimension of general technology familiarity. 
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b. Internet Familiarity 
The current study defines Internet familiarity as a user's understanding oflnternet 
technology based on prior interactions, experiences, or knowledge. Internet 
interaction and experience generally include using e-mail, online shopping, 
reading online articles, searching information, social networking, and online 
education, and other behaviors involving the Internet. 
Early research on the adoption of computers has shown that the extent of a 
user's experience with certain technology influences his/her attitude and behavior 
the technology, and more specifically, the perceived usefulness of the technology, 
and the intention to use it again (Davis, 1989). Since the Internet is a relatively 
new technology, not all consumers are equally familiar with it; and even when 
they are, most people use the Internet for information searches rather than for 
purchasing on-line (Anckar 2003). For example, novices may experience more 
difficulty in using a site and rate the site's performance poorer than an experienced 
person. 
Preliminary evidence suggests that the higher the level of user's experience 
with the Internet, the more positive their attitude toward Web sites (Bruner & 
Kumar, 2000). According to one survey of Internet users, in clarifying the level of 
experience, 35 % of participants classified themselves as "novices" while 23% 
classified themselves as "high end novices" (Poston, Stafford, & Hennington, 
2005). 
In sum, individuals have different levels of Internet familiarity, and thus 
Internet familiarity is a dimension of technology familiarity in anti-spyware 
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program adoption. As the last dimension of general technology familiarity, this 
study examines security familiarity. 
c. Security Familiarity 
Security familiarity is defined as a user's understanding of security issues based 
on prior interactions, experiences, or knowledge. Security issues include 
information privacy, computer and Internet security, and others. More than 1.8 
million known malware and security risks exist on the Internet, representing an 
unprecedented threat to online security and privacy (Security, 2008). 
Internet users know that spyware is a security problem, so they would like to 
protect themselves from spyware. In some cases, users are not aggressive in their 
plans to take protective actions due either to lack of perceived technical skill or 
lack ofrecognition of the severity of the computer security (Poston et al. 2005). 
Security issues such as information privacy have been identified as one of the 
most important issues of contemporary management practice (Mason, 1986). 
According to a recent survey of IT executives, security concerns are increasing on 
the ranking of managements' most important concerns (Luftman & McLean, 
2004). 
In efforts to reduce the threats posed to information systems security concerns, 
IT managers devote an increasing amount of resources to threat detection and 
amelioration (Whitman, 2003). Smith, Milberg, and Burke (1996) developed and 
validated an instrument that identifies and measures the primary dimensions of 
individuals' concerns about organizational information privacy practices. The 
result reflects four dimensions of concern for information privacy: collection, 
errors, secondary use, and unauthorized access. In the context of spyware, 
individuals are concerned about secondary use and unauthorized access of 
information since spyware can trace keystroke and monitor user's Web behavior 
without consent. 
In sum, individuals have different levels of security familiarity, and thus 
security familiarity is a dimension of general technology familiarity in anti-
spyware program adoption. 
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This section discussed computer familiarity, Internet familiarity, and security 
familiarity as dimensions of general technology familiarity. In the next section, 
knowledge of spyware is examined. 
(3) Knowledge of Spyware 
Knowledge is the body of facts and principles (i.e., information and 
understanding) accumulated by mankind (i.e., stored in memory) about a domain 
(Delbridge & Bernard, 1998). Consumer knowledge literature argues that 
knowledge has a significant and essential influence on the consumer's decision 
making. In consumer research, knowledge includes two components, product 
familiarity and expertise (Alba & Hutchison, 1987). In the meantime, consumer 
knowledge is related to privacy protection, consumer defection, consumer choice, 
information search, and perceived product category uncertainty (Zhang, 2005). 
Also, knowledge enables consumers to shorten the time needed to make decisions 
and reduce the cognitive effort to perform the task (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). 
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In this study, knowledge of spyware focuses on general understanding of 
spyware rather than specific features of spyware. Following the definition of 
technology awareness (Dinev & Hart, 2006), this study defines knowledge of 
spyware as a individual's raised consciousness of and interest in knowing about 
technological issues and strategies to deal with spyware. Zhang (2005) empirically 
tested four measures to assess the respondents' knowledge of spyware: tracking 
keystrokes, recording online transactions, monitoring online surfing habits and 
residing on computers. Zhang (2005) found that the sample in the U.S. was only 
familiar with the monitoring surfing habits of spyware. 
In the following section, perceived risk of spyware as another factor of 
adoption intention is introduced. 
(4) Perceived Risk of Spyware 
The concept of perceived risk most often used by consumer researchers defines 
risk in terms of the consumer's perceptions of the uncertainty and adverse 
consequences of buying a product or service. This study defines the perceived risk 
ofspyware as an individual's beliefregarding the probability of gains or losses 
associated with spyware (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
Several studies argued that an individual's perceived risk influences intention 
to perform the behavior for reducing the risk. LaRose, Rifon, and Enbody (2008) 
studied the relationship between the level of personal risk and the individual's 
safety behavior. According to them, moderate amounts of perceived risk increase 
safe behavior, while low amounts of perceived risk reduce safety because the 
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threat is not considered an important problem. However, intensely perceived risk 
can also inhibit safe behavior because people suppress their fear rather than cope 
with the danger. 
According to a survey of Poston et al. (2005), the third most highly 
recognized threat identified by users was spyware, following viruses and spam. 
Although several major internet risks, caused by spam, spyware, and virus 
infection, have declined significantly over the past few years, Internet threats are 
of great concern to Internet users (Consumer Reports, 2008). Steve Gibson (2005) 
indicated spyware as a source of users' concern. 
"Spyware is the PC user's latest and biggest problem; a larger source 
of worry, concern, and fiustration than anything PC users have faced 
before, and potentially more damaging than the worst computer viruses. 
Due to the growing use of PCs for personal tax preparation, online 
banking, investment portfolio management, and real-time e-commerce, 
the threat from privacy violation and identity theft cannot be ignored 
(p38)." 
Trust of anti-spyware programs, the last factor of study, is examined in the 
following section. 
(5) Trust of Anti-Spyware Programs 
Trust is a widely accepted factor of technology acceptance. Trust plays a central 
role in helping people overcome perception of risk and insecurity (McKnight, 
Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002). 
In looking at personalization technology adoption, Komiak and Benbasat 
(2006) divided trust into cognitive trust and emotional trust; and they found that 
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these two types of trust influence intentions to adopt recommendation agents (e.g. 
Web-based product-brokering recommendation agents) as a decision aid or as a 
delegated agent. In the context of e-commerce, Gefen et al. (2003) found a 
positive relationship between trust and the intention to use a business-to-
customers Web site. 
Mayer et al. (1995) proposed an integrative definition of trust as "the 
willingness of a party (trustor) to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
(trustee) based on the expectation that the other (trustee) will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party (trustee)" (p712). Meyer et al. (1995) proposed a generic typology of 
trust, consisting of three dimensions: ability, benevolence, and integrity. These 
three dimensions are conceptually distinct since they incorporate different 
elements of cognitive and affective abstraction of trust (Bhattacherjee, 2002). 
Building upon the research of Mayer et al. 's work (1995), this study defines 
trust as the perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity of users in the anti-
spyware program adoption. Ability is a characteristic including skill and 
competence that makes an anti-spyware program have influence within a specific 
domain (Mayer et al. 1995). Based on this definition, the main ability of an anti-
spyware program includes eliminating spyware, and thus protecting users from 
spyware. Integrity refers to the user's perception that anti-spyware programs are 
honest (Mayer et al. 1995). Benevolence is the extent to which an anti-spyware 
program is believed to intend to do good to the user (Mayer et al. 1995). Figure 2-
8 models these three dimensions of trust. 
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Figure 2-8. Dimensions of Trust 
Benevolence 
Based on Mayer et al. (1995) 
5. Research Model and Hypotheses Development 
Using the theory of reasoned action as its theoretical background, the research 
model used for the present study addressed the causal relationships among five 
variables. The target behavior in this study is anti-spyware program adoption. The 
research model includes the intention to adopt rather than the behavior of adoption 
because the role of intention as a strong predictor of behavior has been well 
established in information systems (Davis 1989; Venkatesh et al. 2003). 
Although attitude mediates the impact of beliefs on intention in the theory of 
reasoned action, attitude is not directly included in the proposed research model 
because (I) the direct effect of beliefs in information systems contexts is generally 
stronger than their indirect effect via attitude (Davis et al. 2003) and (2) the 
influence embodied in attitude is partially captured within the benevolence and 
integrity dimensions of trust (Bhattacherjee, 2002). Thus, this study 
conceptualizes technology familiarity, knowledge of spyware, perceived risk of 
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spyware as a belief, and trust of anti-spyware program as a belief or an attitude. 
Figure 2-9 illustrates the belief - intention framework based on TAM and 
figure 2-10 is the belief - attitude - intention framework based on TRA. 
Incorporating both the TAM and TRA frameworks, the proposed research model is 
presented in figure 2-11. In the rest of this section, the relationships in the model, 
as well as the development of hypotheses, are explained in detail. 
Figure 2-9. Belief-> Intention Framework 










Figure 2-10. Belief-+ Attitude---+ Intention Framework 
















Figure 2-11. Proposed Research Model of Current Study 











(1) General Technology Familiarity 
Familiarity is an important predictor of knowledge. In marketing research, 
familiarity might be generally known information about product categories and 
brands, based on advertising exposure, product purchase/use, and word-of-mouth 
effects (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). Research evidence indicated that brand 
familiarity reduces the need for information search. For example, Biswas's (1992) 
study revealed that consumers tend to spend less time shopping for a familiar 
brand than they do for an unfamiliar brand (Ha & Perks, 2005). 
The current study assumes that individuals with familiarity can obtain more 
specific knowledge. In the same vein, individuals' previous experience and 
knowledge about technologies affect specific knowledge of spyware. In turn, 
when individuals have more familiarity with general technology in terms of the 
computer, internet, and security, they might be more able to obtain and understand 
specific knowledge of spyware and anti-spyware programs. Also general 
technology familiarity helps users estimate the likelihood of new technology, and 
thus increase their trust of new technology. Thus, this study expects that 
technology familiarity is positively related to knowledge of spyware, perceived 
risk of spyware, and trust of anti-spyware programs. 
Despite having little knowledge of spyware, individuals' general technology 
familiarity will increase their intention to adopt anti-spyware programs. Since past 
behavior is often a good predictor of future behaviors, general technology 
familiarity can be expected to have a direct effect on an individual's willingness to 
adopt anti-spyware programs (Gefen, 2000). According to Zhang (2005), the 
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individuals' familiarity about the computer and Internet affects their behavior 
toward personal protection with computers. In sum, this study sets forth the 
following hypotheses related to general technology familiarity. 
HJ: General technology familiarity is positively related to knowledge ofspyware. 
H2: General technology familiarity is positively related to perceived risk of spyware. 
H3: General technology familiarity is positively related to trust of anti-spyware programs. 
H4: General technology familiarity is positively related to adoption intention. 
(2) Knowledge of Spyware 
When individuals have knowledge of spyware, they would feel more threatened 
by spyware because they would know that spyware harms computer usage by 
slowing computer and internet speed as well as by infringing on individuals' 
privacy without any permission. 
This study argues that the more knowledge the user has, the stronger the 
perceived risk of spyware. For example, if a user only knows that spyware slows 
computer hardware, his or her perceived risk would be low. If the user knows that 
spyware can trace keystrokes, so that it can get credit card numbers, he or she 
should feel a higher risk of spyware. In the same vein, a user with high level 
knowledge on spyware would more likely to trust anti-spyware programs because 
anti-spyware programs are the best way to protect computers against spyware. 
Based on the TRA, the beliefs - attitudes - intentions framework supports 
this study's presented arguments in terms of perceived risk and trust. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) regarded knowledge as a belief held by individual. The belief 
influences an individual's positive attitude, which is partially included in trust of 
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anti-spyware programs in the present study. According to Jasperson, Zmud, and 
Sambamurthy (2003), knowledge influences belief. Thus, individuals with a high 
level of knowledge of spyware would have negative belief (risk) of spyware and 
positive belief (trust) of anti-spyware programs. 
In the Web behavior context, several studies concluded that the online 
shopping experience influenced consumer's intention to purchase products 
(Steven, Gerald, & Eric, 1999). Gefen et al. (2003) pointed out that with increased 
knowledge, intention to use systems or use online shopping increased. In the 
organizational context, Rogers (1995) discussed the role of knowledge in 
influencing persuasion, which in turn influences decision and implementation. 
Churchman (1971) noted that knowledge goes beyond being a collection of 
information and has the meaning of action and potential for action. Sveiby ( 1997) 
also referred to knowledge as "a capacity to act." Likewise consumer knowledge 
is a significant predictor of consumer's decision making (Zhang, 2005). 
In sum, this study has the following hypotheses related to knowledge of 
spyware as a predictor. 
H5: Knowledge of spyware is positively related to perceived risk of spyware. 
H6: Knowledge of spyware is positively related to trust of anti-spyware programs. 
H7: Knowledge of spyware is positively related to adoption intention. 
(3) Perceived Risk of Spyware 
The phrase: enemy of my enemy is my friend is very relevant to this study. 
Individual's negative belief about spyware would influence the positive belief and 
attitude about anti-spyware programs. In other words, a perceived risk of spyware 
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will increase trust of anti-spyware program. 
The proposed research model predicts that individuals engage in risk-reducing 
activities by adopting anti-spyware programs in order to reduce their perceived 
risk level. 
Because of the pnvacy invasions by spyware, anti-spyware utilities are 
becoming necessary software to safeguard security (Clyman, 2004). Individuals 
with a negative perception of spyware will perform safety behavior to remove the 
danger of spyware because risks by spyware can be managed or reduced when 
users adopt anti-spyware programs. 
According to Hu and Dinev (2007), awareness of the dangers of spyware was 
a direct predictor of intentions to take protective measures. Therefore, perceived 
risk of spyware positively influences intention to adopt anti-spyware programs. 
Similarly, it is possible that user's trust of anti-spyware programs might reduce the 
perceived risk of spyware. However, this study does not consider this casual 
relationship because this study focuses on the path from a user's general 
technology familiarity to intention to adopt anti-spyware programs. Thus, this 
study assumes that a user's perceived risk of anti-spyware is an antecedent of trust 
of anti-spyware program. 
In sum, this study has the following hypotheses related to the perceived risk of 
spyware. 
H8: Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to trust of anti-spyware programs. 
H9: Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to adoption intention. 
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(4) Trust of Anti-Spyware Programs 
In consumer-based e-commerce contexts, trusting intention represents users' 
intention to engage in consequent transactions with online firms (Jarvenpaa, 
Tractinsky, & Vitale, 2000). In the context of protective information systems, 
people develop trust toward adopting anti-spyware programs when they perceive 
it as an effective tool to enhance security and privacy of their system against 
spyware (Lee & Kozar, 2008). In this study, benevolence and integrity in trust 
partially include positive attitude (Bhattacherjee, 2002) as well as belief. Thus, 
trust of anti-spyware program will influence intention to adopt anti-spyware 
programs. 
HJ 0: Trust of anti-spyware programs is positively related to adoption intention. 
(5) Hypothesis for differences between the U.S. and South Korea 
Cross-country comparative study is a stream of information systems research. 
Several studies have found differences between countries in terms of the Internet, 
e-commerce, and IT awareness and adoption. 
Park and Jun (2002) examined the differences in the internet usage, 
innovativeness on the Internet, the perceived risks of online shopping and online 
shopping behavior between the U.S. and South Korea. Significant differences 
were found in Internet usage and perceived risks of online shopping, indicating 
that the sample in South Korea showed longer usage of the Internet per week and 
higher perceived risks of usage of the Internet per week and higher perceived risks 
ofonline shopping than found in the U.S. Hwang, Jung, and Salvendy (2006) 
investigated online shopping preferences in three countries - the U.S., South 
Korea, and Turkey; and found significant cross-national differences in online 
shopping preferences with regard to information accuracy, security and product-
price comparison. 
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Studies have examined the cultural differences in perceived trust in e-
commerce. Jarvenpaa and Tractinsky (1999) argued that the cultural background 
of an online consumer is one of determinants of trust. Karvonen, Cardholrn, and 
Karlsson (2000) tried to find out the role of cultural factors in the formation of 
trust on the users of e-commerce by comparing Finnish users with Swedish users 
and found that the differences in user's perception on security issues of e-
commerce between two groups existed, but not significantly. Meanwhile, Siala, 
O'Keefe, and Hone (2004) examined whether religion as a cultural variable can be 
a factor of trust in the context of e-commerce. They found that the Muslim users 
showed significantly more trust in the Muslim site compared to the Christian site. 
Schmidt, Johnston, Arnett, Chen, and Li (2008) investigated computer 
security awareness in terms of virus, spyware, and rootkit between the U.S. and 
China; and they found significant differences in the U.S. and Chinese user 
perceptions with regard to spyware and computer viruses and U.S. users had a 
higher self-reported knowledge of spyware and viruses. 
The distinct cultural difference between the U.S. and South Korea is 
individualism/collectivism, defined as the "degree to which the individual 
emphasizes his/her own needs as opposed to the group needs and prefers to act as 
an individual rather than as a member of a group (Strite & Karahanna, 2006, 
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p682). In the individualistic cultures, social behavior is mainly guided by personal 
goals, while in collectivistic cultures the goals of the collective have the dominant 
influence in shaping behavior (Triandis, 1989). In individualistic cultures, the self 
is regarded as separate from society and identity is determined by individual 
achievement rather than in terms of group membership and the position of the 
group in society (Hofstede, 1980). The U.S. is considered an individualistic while 
South Korea is considered a collectivistic culture. This study examines the 
differences between the U.S. and South Korea in terms of computer, Internet, and 
security familiarity, knowledge of spyware, perceived risk of spyware, trust of 
anti-spyware programs, and intention to adopt anti-spyware programs. 
Aforementioned constructs are regarded as anti-spyware adoption attitude in this 
study. 
In sum, each country has different backgrounds, leading to the following 
hypothesis formulated for the current study. 
Hll: Significant differences exist in anti-spyware adoption attitude between the 
U.S. and South Korea. 
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A summary of research hypotheses and the expected direction of relationship 
are illustrated in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2. Summary of Research Hypotheses 
Reference 
Hypothesis Direction of 
Number relationship 
Hl 
General technology familiarity is positively related to the 
+ knowledge of spyware. 
H2 
General technology familiarity is positively related to 
+ perceived risk of spyware. 
H3 
General technology familiarity is positively related to trust 
+ of anti-spyware programs. 
H4 
General technology familiarity is positively related to 
+ adoption intention. 
H5 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to perceived 
+ risk of spyware. 
H6 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to trust of 
+ anti-spyware programs. 
H7 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to adoption 
+ intention. 
H8 
Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to trust of 
+ anti-spyware programs. 
H9 
Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to adoption 
+ intention. 
HlO 
Trust of anti-spyware programs is positively related to 
+ adoption intention. 
Hll 
Significant differences exist in anti-spyware adoption 
NIA attitude between the U.S. and South Korea. 
In chapter 3, the research methods used in this study are explained. Chapter 3 




Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology. The first section will provide a 
brief outline of the methodology. 
1. Outline of the Research Methodology 
This study examined general technology familiarity and anti-spyware program 
adoption, utilizing an experiential exploratory survey. Figure 3-1 presents an 
overview of the research methodology of this study. The participants were 
undergraduate and graduate college students in the U.S. and South Korea. 
The experiential survey was administered to college students and then 
measured the variables of interest to this study. The data of the surveys from two 
countries was collected and analyzed. The rest of this chapter provides the details 
about research methods, including sampling, statistical analysis, and validation 
methods. 
Figure 3-1. Research Methodology 
Population 
Instrument Development 
(Current and Potential users of 
Computer and Internet in the 




(College students in the U.S 
and South Korea) 
IRBReview 





Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Structural Equation Modeling 
Discussion of Results 
(Chapter 4 & 5) 
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2. PopulaJion and Sample 
The target population for this study was current and potential users of the Internet 
in the U.S. and South Korea. The participants for this study were undergraduate 
and graduate students, of all level currently enrolled at both Morehead State 
University2 in the U.S. and Yeungnam University3 in South Korea. Although 
some bias may exist due to a convenience sampling, students are regarded as an 
appropriate surrogate in technology acceptance research because students are 
current and potential users' of anti-spyware program. McKnight et al. (2002) 
argued that students could be used as subjects for research that resembles the real 
situation, such as in the context of protective technology adoption. Thus, this 
study used college students as participants to develop a new model in context of 
protective technology acceptance. 
3. Survey Instrument Development 
One of objectives of this study was to develop a survey instrument to 
appropriately measure the dimensions of technology familiarity as well as the 
other constructs that comprise the proposed anti-spyware program adoption model. 
The instruments of the study were developed based on existing literature. The 
literature review identified three dimensions of general technology familiarity in 
2 This is a public university and located in Morehead, Kentucky. The university offers 78 
undeigraduate degree programs, including 8 associate level degrees and 12 pre-
professional programs in four colleges and 20 academic departments. Enrollment for fall 
2007 was 9,066. 
3 This is a private university and located in Gyeongsan, Gyeongsangbokdo. The 
university has 13 colleges, 71 academic departments, and 8 graduate schools. The 
university has 22,000 undeigraduate students, 3,500 graduate students, and 1,000 faculty 
members and staff. 
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the context of protective technology adoption and examined other variables. 
Items for each variable in the technology acceptance model were adopted 
from previous validated scales. In turn, this study modified previous scales when 
appropriate to ensure discriminant validity. The items were measured using a 
seven-point Likert scale with the highest level assigned 7 points, the middle level 
assigned 4 points, and the lowest level assigned 1 point. This ranking was selected 
to coincide with the seven-point Likert scales planned for the other survey 
oriented measures. 
A pilot test was conducted with 83 respondents to check respondents' 
understanding. Next, the main test was conducted. After exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis, this study reduced the number of items to the 
generally accepted three to five for structural equation modeling. New variables 
(computer, Internet, and security familiarity) have five of the final number of 
items in each. The items for each variable are discussed next. 
(1) General Technology Familiarity 
The dimensions of general technology familiarity used for this study are computer 
familiarity, Internet familiarity, and security familiarity. 
Schulenberg et al. (2006) developed an instrument for computer familiarity, 
computer aversion, and .attitude. The current study adopts the items of computer 
familiarity of Schulenberg et al (2006). Among these items are using computer 
hardware and software, and reading computer magazines. For Internet familiarity, 
this study adopted the instruments of Spiros et al. (2005). However, another 
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Internet activity was added: reading articles on the Internet. Zhang (2005) 
measured users' security knowledge. The current study adopted and modified the 
instrument items of Zhang (2005). An item for general familiarity (Gefen, 2000) is 
included in each sub-construct as well. These sub-constructs of technology 
familiarity were measured by how strongly users agreed with each item. Each 
item of computer, Internet, and security familiarity is represented in the Tables 3-1, 
3-2, and 3-3. These tables also illustrated which items were deleted in the main 
study based on the results of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). 
Table 3-1. Source and Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis for Computer Familiarity Items 
Code Name Item Result Source 
CF! 
Latest 
I keep up with the latest computer hardware. Deleted Schulenberg Hardware afterCFA et al. 2006 
CF2 
Changing I am familiar with changing (installing/ Schulenberg 
Hardware uograding) computer hardware. et al. 2006 
CF3 
Hardware 
I am familiar with computer hardware. Schulenberg Familiaritv et al. 2006 
CF4 
Latest 
I keep up with the latest computer software. Deleted Schulenberg Software afterCFA et al. 2006 
CFS 
Changing I am familiar with changing (installing/ Schulenberg 
Software un,rradino:) computer software. et al. 2006 
CF6 
Software 
I am familiar with computer software. Schulenberg Familiaritv et al. 2006 
CF7 Reading I am familiar with reading computer Deleted Schulenberg 
Magazine magazines. afterEFA et al. 2006 
CFS Computer Overall, I am familiar with computers. Gefen,2000 Familiaritv 
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Table 3-2. Source and Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis for Internet Familiarity Items 
Code Name Item Result Source 
!Fl 
Search I am familiar with the use of search engines. Deleted Spiros et al. Emnnes afterCFA 2005 
IF2 
E-mail I am familiar with the use of e-mail. Spiros et al. Use 2005 
IF3 
Searching I am familiar with searching information in Spiros et al. 
fufonnation Internet 2005 
IF4 
Purchasing I am familiar with purchasing products in Deleted 
New Products Internet. afterCFA 
IFS 
Reading I am familiar with reading articles in Internet. Deleted New Articles afterCFA 
IF6 
Internet Overall, I am familiar with Internet. Gefeu,2000 Familiaritv 
Table 3-3. Source and Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis for Security Familiarity Items 
Code Name Item Result Source 
SF! 
Privacy I am familiar with privacy violation issue. Deleted Zhang, Violation afterEFA 2005 
SF2 
Protective I am familiar with knowledge on protecting Deleted Zhang, 
Knowledge oneself. afterCFA 2005 
SF3 
Security I am familiar with security technology. Zhang, Technolo-· 2005 
SF4 
Information I am familiar with information security. Zhang, Securitv 2005 
SFS Computer I am familiar with computer security. New Securitv 
SF6 
Internet I am familiar with Internet security. New Securitv 
SF7 
Security Overall, I am familiar with security issues. Gefeu,2000 Familiaritv 
(2) Knowledge of Spyware 
Dinev and Hu (2007) identified the construct, awareness of spyware. This study 
adopted and modified items designed by Dinev and Hu (2007) for the knowledge 
of spyware construct. This study also measured general knowledge of spyware by 
users (Bassellier et al. 2003). The items of knowledge of spyware are represented 
in Table 3-4. 
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Table 3-4. Source and Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis for Knowledge of Spyware Items 
Code Name Item Result Source 
KS! Updating I update news and developments about tbe Deleted Dinev& Knowledge spyware technology. afterCFA Hu,2007 
KS2 Malicious I know about tbe problems of malicious Dinev& Software software intruding Internet users' computers Hu,2007 
KS3 Seeking I seek advice on computer web sites or Dinev& Advice nes about anti-spvware products. Hu,2007 
KS4 Problem& I have knowledge of spyware problems and Dinev& Results consequences. Hu,2007 
KS5 Spyware Overall, I have general knowledge of spyware. Bassellier et Knowledge al. 2003 
(3) Perceived Risk of Spyware 
Workman et al. (2008) empirically tested security lapse, omission of information 
security, and perceived severity item in their instrument. The current study 
adopted and modified the instrument items developed by Workman et al. (2008). 
Table 3-5 displays items used in the present study to measure perceived risk of 
spyware. 
Table 3-5. Source and Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis for Perceived Risk of Spyware Items 
Code Name Item Result Source 
PRS Hannto I believe tbat spyware causes significant harm Deleted Workman et 
I Computers to mv computer. afterCFA al. 2008 
PRS Computer I believe that my computer is at risk if Workman et 
2 Risk spyware is downloaded. al. 2008 
PRS Personal I believe that my personal information is at Workman et 
3 Information risk if snvware is downloaded. al. 2008 
PRS Personal I am concerned about threat to my personal Deleted Workman et 
4 Privacy privacy by snvware. afterCFA al. 2008 
PRS Threat by I am worried about threat to my computer by Workman et 
5 Spyware snvware. al. 2008 
PRS Risk of Overall, I believe tbat spyware is risky Workman et 6 Sovware al. 2008 
47 
(4) Trust of Anti-Spyware Programs 
Mayer et al. (1995) conceptually examined three dimensions of trust. 
Bhattacherjee (2002) developed and validated trust instruments in an online 
shopping environment. The current study employed the instruments designed by 
Bhattacherjee (2002) to measure trust of anti-spyware programs. Table 3-6 
displays trust items included in the current study. 
Table 3-6. Source and Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis for Trust of Anti-Spyware Programs 
Code Name Item Result Soun:e 
D\.l Ability 1 
Anti-spyware programs have the skills and Bhattacherj 
~ertise to remove sovware. ee,2002 
D\.2 Ability 2 
Anti-spyware programs have the ability to Deleted Bhattacherj 
orotect me from soyware. afterCFA ee,2002 
D\.3 Integrity 
Anti-spyware programs are fair in its conduct Bhattacherj 
of comnuter nrotection. ee, 2002 
Benevolence 
Anti-spyware programs keep its users' best 
Bhattacherj D\.4 I interest in mind during working against ee,2002 
snvware. 
TA5 Benevolence 
Anti-spyware programs make good-faith Deleted Bhattacherj 
2 efforts to address most user concerns. afterCFA ee,2002 
D\.6 Trust 
Overall, anti-spyware programs are Bhattacherj 
trustworthv. ee,2002 
(5) Intention to Adopt Anti-Spyware Programs 
Instruments to measure adoption intention have been well developed in 
information systems research. This study adopts the instruments of intention to 
adopt anti-spyware program from two recent studies of anti-spyware program 
adoption. Table 3-7 shows the items. 
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Table 3-7. Source and Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis for Intention to Adopt Anti-Spyware Programs 
Code Name Item Result Source 
!Al 
Likelihood I am likely to use anti-spyware programs. Deleted Lee& ofUse afterCFA Kozar,2008 
IA2 
Prediction I predict that I will adopt anti-spyware Lee& 
ofUse orop,rnms. Kozar,2008 
Intention to I intend to periodically use anti-spyware Dinev& !A3 Use program to protect my computer from Hu,2007 
snvware. 
Recommen I will recommend to others that they use anti- Dinev& IA4 ding to Hu,2007 
Others spyware programs. 
IA5 Multiple I will use two or more anti-spyware programs Deleted New Use ifhelnful. afterCFA 
4. Pilot Test 
The pilot test was conducted to help refine wording, test validation, and eliminate 
potential problems in the survey instrument. After drafting the initial survey, one 
professor, two staff ( a research associate and a librarian), and five masters students 
examined the survey in terms of wording, understanding, and content validity. In 
tum, the pilot test was administered to undergraduate students in four classes to 
test initial validity and reliability as well as to identify ambiguity in item wording. 
Based on the English survey, the researcher, a native Korean, translated the 
survey instrument to Korean. To employ common and well-known terms for 
scholarly fields and real world, an English-Korean dictionary, Korean scholarly 
articles, Korean portal sites and Web pages, and Korean newspapers were used. 
Next one doctoral student, one information technology specialist, one masters 
student and one journalist examined the survey to clarify wording and 
understanding. After examining the Korean survey, the reviewers compared 
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English and Korean. Some pointed out two technical terms which Korean students 
might have difficulty understanding: keystroke and denial of service (DOS) attack. 
Although Korean Web sites, scholarly articles, and newspapers use the terms 
directly, the Korean survey uses explanatory notes to clarify these terms. Finally, 
six people similar to the respondents were requested to note ambiguity in terms of 
wording and understanding. The respondent validation group responded that all of 
the survey items were understandable. 
5. Procedure for Main Study 
Structural Equation Modeling is a large-sample technique. Because sample size is 
an important issue in research, this study used a sample size which exceeds the 
recommended minimum case-per-variable ratio of five observations per item (Hair, 
Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 1998). Therefore, this study examined at least 200 
subjects in each country. 
The study used a paper-based survey. The researcher asked instructors to 
administer the survey in various classes at universities in the U.S. and South 
Korea. In each class, students, who are at least 18 years old, were solicited to 
participate in the survey. The same procedure was used in a middle size university 
in the U.S. and a large size university in South Korea. The collected data from the 
survey was screened to provide clean data for the testing of the main research 
model. 
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7. Data Analysis 
Using SPSS 16.0, the responses from the survey were coded into a data file for 
statistical analyses. When two or more invalid and incomplete responses were 
found in each subject, all responses from subjects were dropped. One missing data 
in one variable was operated by using mean value. The basic information from the 
participants (i.e. demographics, usages for anti-spyware programs, and computer 
and Internet experience) were then analyzed. 
8. Statistics for Main Stud/ 
This study utilized four main statistics to analyze the data: analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA), exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA), and structural equation modeling (SEM). For this study, SPSS 16.0 for 
EFAandANCOVAand AMOS 16.0 for CFAand SEMwere used. 
(1) Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) 
Because this study compared two countries, ANCOVA was first conducted to 
determine if the differences between the U.S. and South Korea regarding each 
constructs were, in fact, significant. Gender, age, major, and classification were 
chosen as control variables. 
4 The summary of statistics being used is based on Kline (2005), and several dissertations 
and journal articles. 
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(2) Exploratoiy Factor Analysis (EFA) 
Although the survey instruments were derived from previous studies, the 
instruments were modified based on the purpose of the present study. Also, this 
study compares the U.S. with South Korea. Therefore, EFA examines if each item 
is included in the factors which the study wants to measure. In tum, principle 
components analysis and a Varimax rotation method were used. Factor loadings of 
0.5 or greater are considered practically significant and used for this study (Hair et 
al. 1998). 
(3) ConfirmatoiyFactor Analysis (CFA) 
CFA was employed for testing the measurement model. In contrast to exploratoiy 
factor analysis, where all loadings are free to vaiy, CFA allows for the explicit 
constraint of certain loadings to be zero. In the measurement model, this study 
tested convergent validity, internal consistency, composite reliability, and 
discriminant validity. The measurement model for CFA is presented in figure 3-2. 
Figure 3-2. Measurement Model (Confirmatory Factor Analysis) 
Email Use IF2 
Searching Information (IF3) 
Internet Famlllarity (IFS) 
Internet Security (SF6) 
Security Famlllarlty (SF7) 
Malicious Software (KS2) 
Seeking Advlce(KS3) 
Problem & Results(KS4) 
Spyware Knowledge (KS5) 
Computer Risk (PRS2) 
Personal Information (PRS3) 
Threat by Spyware (PRS5) 
Risk of S yware PRS6 
Ability 1 (TA 1) 
Integrity (TA3) 
Benevolence 1 (TA4) 
Trust (TA6) 
Predict lo n of Use (IA2) 
Intention to Use (IA3) 













(4) Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
The main objectives of SEM are to test and estimate causal relationships using a 
combination of statistical data and qualitative causal assumptions (Pearl, 2000). 
SEM encourages confirmatory rather than exploratory modeling, and thus it is 
good for theory testing rather than theory building. In SEM, the qualitative causal 
assumptions are represented by the missing variables in each equation, as well as 
vanishing covariances among some error terms. 
This study focuses on the relationships among several latent variables, and 
thus SEM is a proper analysis to help meet the research objectives. SEM has many 
advantages over older generation multivariate analyses (Byrne, 2001): (1) SEM 
allows a confirmatory approach, such as in the case of theory testing, (2) 
researchers can assess or correct for measurement error, (3) data analyses using 
SEM procedures can incorporate latent (unobserved) and observed variables, (4) 
SEM provides methods for modeling multivariate relations (multiple independent 
and dependent variables) and for estimating point and/or interval indirect effects. 
In turn, SEM provides a more accurate interpretation of the model. Based on the 
literature review and expected relationships developed in chapter 2, a path 







Figure 3-3. Structural Equation Model 
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Table 3-8 is the summary of statistics being used to test each hypothesis 
Table 3-8. Summary of Statistics for Hypotheses 
H Explanation Statistics 
Hl 
General technology familiarity is positively related to the 
SEM knowledge of sovware. 
H2 General technology familiarity is positively related to perceived SEM risk of spvware. 
H3 General technology familiarity is positively related to trust of SEM anti-spyware programs. 
H4 
General technology familiarity is positively related to adoption 
SEM intention. 
HS 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to perceived risk of 
SEM spyware. 
H6 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to trust of anti-
SEM spyware programs. 
H7 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to adoption 
SEM intention. 
HS 
Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to trust of anti-
SEM spvware programs_ 
H9 
Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to adoption 
SEM intention. 
RIO Trust of anti-spyware programs is positively related to adoption SEM intention. 
Hll 
Significant differences exist in anti-spyware adoption attitude 
ANCOVA between the U.S. and South Korea. 
First, the differences between the U.S. and South Korea are identified 
according to the results of the ANCOVA and descriptive analysis. Next, the 
measurement model is tested by CFA and revised. In turn, each hypothesis is 
examined according to the results of the SEM, and the structural model was 
revised according to Ml (modification index). The significance and strength of the 
proposed relationships are investigated to determine if each hypothesis is 
supported. In turn, the significance and the factors of differences are inspected. 




Chapter 4 describes the results of the statistical analysis, including data screening, 
descriptive statistics, and an examination of the measurement and structural 
models. 
1. Data Screening 
The author administered the instrument in the U.S., while a well-educated 
administrator administered the survey instruments in South Korea in November, 
2008. Students enrolled in selected classes at the U.S. and South Korean 
universities were asked to fill out a paper survey during class time. Using 
convenience sampling, the response rates in both countries were 100 percent. 
Over a period of three weeks, a total of 696 students (360 in the U.S. and 336 
in South Korea) participated in the survey. Surveys with more than two missing 
values for one construct were eliminated. The cases that had single items missing 
per construct were treated with the item mean substitution method in SPSS, 
method for treating Likert-type scale missing data (Downey & King, 1998). This 
study had 686 usable responses. 
2. Demographic Information 
Descriptive statistics of participants showed gender, age, major and classification. 
The U.S. sample included 40.1% male and 59.9% female, while the South Korean 
sample included 50.8% male and 49.2% female. The majority of participants were 
aged from 18 to 27 (U.S: 93.6% and South Korea: 99.1%), the age range typical 
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of a traditional university student. Seven percent of participants majored in 
computer science and computer information systems, 8.1 % business related, and 
84.8% were others in the U.S; 6.7% business students and 93.3% were others in 
South Korea. U.S results reported 43.4% freshmen, 17.4% sophomore, 16.0% 
junior, 19.1% senior, and 2.5% graduate students; South Korea showed 22.5% 
freshmen, 28.9% sophomore, 27.4% junior, 19.1% senior, and 2.1% graduate 
students. The demographics in both the U.S. and South Korea were analyzed and 
are presented in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1. Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents 
Variable Category 
U.S (%) South Korea (%) Total 
N=357 (100) N= 329 (100) 686 (100) 
Male 143 (40.1) 167 (50.8) 310 (45.2) 
Gender 
Female 214 (59.9) 162 (49.2) 376 (54.8) 
18-27 334 (93.6) 326 (99.1) 660 (96.0) 
Age 28-35 19 (5.3) - 19 (3.0) 
>35 4 (1.1) 3 (0.8) 7 (1.0) 
Freshman 155 (43.4) 74 (22.5) 229 (33.4) 
Sophomore 62 (17.4) 95 (28.9) 157 (22.9) 
Classification Junior 57 (16.0) 90 (27.4) 147 (21.4) 
Senior 74 (20.7) 63 (19.1) 137 (20.0) 
Graduate 9 (2.5) 7 (2.1) 16 (2.3) 
CS/CIS 25 (7.0) - 25 (3.6) 
Major 
Engineering 8 (2.2) 63 (19.1) 71 (10.3) 
Business 29 (8.1) 22 (6.7) 51 (7.4) 
Others 295 (82.6) 244 (74.2) 539 (78.6) 
The participants were asked to answer questions related to computer usage 
including spyware usage, operating systems, and time spent using computer and 
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the Internet. The majority of participants (66.9% in U.S and 52.6% in South 
Korea) used anti-spyware programs. Thirty-one percent in the U.S and 42.9% in 
South Korea used one anti-spyware program, and 25.4% in the U.S and 23.7% in 
South Korea used two or more anti-spyware programs. This study also asked how 
much was spent on the computer and Internet. Overall, 62.5% of participators in 
the U.S and 65% in South Korea spent from one to five hours using the computer 
each day; 77.6% of respondents in the U.S and 80.9% of South Korean 
respondents for Internet use. Usages for anti-spyware programs, computer, and 
Internet are presented in Table 4-2. 




Variable Category (%) N=357 N=329 N=686 
Anti-spyware 
Yes 239 (66.9) 173 (52.6) 412 (60.1) 
No 41 (11.5) 95 (28.9) 136 (19.8) program Use 
Not sure 77 (21.6) 61 (18.5) 138 (20.1) 
Number of 
1 110 (34.1) 118 (42.9) 228 (33.2) 
2 29 (18.3) 56 (20.4) 85 (12.4) 
anti-spyware 
>3 23 (7.1) 9 (3.3) 32 (4.7) programs used 
Not sure 131 (40.6) 92 (33.5) 223 (32.5) 
O.S. WmdowsXP 209 (59) 277 (84.2) 486 (70.8) 
(multiple Windows Vista 176 (49) 49 (14.9) 225 (32.8) 
responses) Others 29 (8) 7 (2.1) 36 (5.2) 
Less than 1 112 (31.4) 100 (30.4) 212 (30.9) 
hour 
Time spent 
1 uo to 2 hours 118 (33.1) 110 (33.4) 228 (33.2) 
2 up to 3 hours 59 (16.5) 69 (21.0) 128 (18.7) 
using Computer 3 up to 4 hours 27 (7.6) 25 (7.6) 52 (7.6) 
4 up to 5 hours 19 (5.3) 10 (3.0) 29 (4.2) 
5 hours more 22 (6.2) 15 (4.6) 37 (5.4) 
Less than 1 44 (12.3) 48 (14.6) 92(13.4) 
hour 
Time spent 
1 uo to 2 hours 132 (37.0) 127 (38.6) 259 (37.8) 
2 uo to 3 hours 82 (23.0) 96 (29.2) 178 (25.9) 
using Internet 
3 uo to 4 hours 35 (9.8) 27 (8.2) 62 (9.0) 
4 up to 5 hours 28 (7.8) 16 (4.9) 44 (6.4) 
5 hours more 32 (9.0) 15 (4.6) 47 (6.9) 
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3. Measurement Model 
Descriptive statistics, as well as exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory 
factor analysis were used to examine and refine the measurement model. The 
measurement model was used to evaluate the validity and reliability of the items. 
(1) Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA 
Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of the measurement scales 
were identified. Each of the items were measured by a seven-point Likert-type 
I 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The higher the 
mean score, the more the respondent agreed with the item. The lower the score, 
the more the individual disagreed with the statement. 
Analysis of covariance was also conducted for testing Hll. For ANCOVA, 
this study used four control variables: gender, major, age, and classification. Every 
construct ( computer familiarity, Internet familiarity, security familiarity, 
knowledge of spyware, perceived risk of spyware, trust of anti-spyware programs, 
and intention to adopt anti-spyware programs) was examined by ANCOVA. 
In statistics, p-values of every construct significantly differed at the 0.05 
level. Thus, the results supported HI 1. The descriptive statistics and the results of 
ANCOVA are showed in Appendix A; and the results are discussed in the 
conclusion. 
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(2) Reliability Test 
Two types of reliability tests were conducted, using standardized Cronbach's 
alpha: split halfreliability and interrater reliability. 
Split half reliability randomly splits the data set into two. A score for each 
participant is then calculated based on each half of the scale. If a scale is very 
reliable, a person's score on one half of the scale should be the same or similar to 
their score on the other half. This study had acceptable results from split half 
reliability test in the U.S. and South Korea (See table 4-3). 
This study used two languages for the questionnaire, which asked the same 
questions. Also, the results were significantly different between the U.S and South 
Korea. Thus, interrater reliability was tested. Each construct had affordable results 
for comparison, 0.913 to 0.961 in U.S and 0.869 to 0.948 in South Korea. The 
results are in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3. Reliability Test 
Standardized item aloha 
# U.S. South Korea Variables 
items First Second Total Fm Second Total 
Total 
Half Half Half Half N=686 
N=179 N=178 N=357 N=165 N=I64 N=329 
Computer Familiarity 8 .935 .934 .934 .926 .932 .929 .932 
Internet Familiarity 6 .925 .877 .906 .889 .881 .885 .902 
Security Familiarity 7 .972 .973 .972 .930 .929 .930 .961 
Knowledge of Spyware 5 .936 .934 .935 .903 .918 .911 .927 
Perceived Risk of 
6 .970 .949 s .960 .940 .944 .942 .952 
Trust of anti-spyware 
6 .955 .933 nro~mo .945 .944 .924 .935 .945 
Intention to Adopt 
5 .955 .940 .948 .923 .919 .921 .938 Anti-Spyware Programs 
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(3) Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis was used to identify whether the correlations between 
a set of indicators stem from their relationship to one or more constructs in the 
data. Seven of the proposed constructs that have been drawn from and modified 
from previous studies were examined with a principal components factor analysis 
using a Varimax rotation. However, CF7 (Reading Magazine) was less than 0.5 in 
the U.S. (0.479) and South Korea (0.499); and SFl (Privacy Violation) was less 
than 0.5 in South Korea (0.437). After dropping CF7 and SFl, a second factor 
analysis was done. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is the test to assess the 
appropriateness of using factor analysis on data. KMO is 0.949 in the U.S. and, 
0.917 in South Korea, which means highly acceptable. The results of first and 
second exploratory factor analysis are showed in Appendix B. 
( 4) Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
This study tested the research model through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
using AMOS 16.0 for Windows. The covariance structural model consists of two 
parts: the measurement model, and the structural model. Following Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988), the model was tested using a two-stage approach: (1) 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to evaluate construct validity regarding 
convergent and discriminant validity, and (2) structural equation modeling to test 
the hypotheses. The CFA and SEM examined goodness of fit, checking possible 
improvement (Ml: modification indices), and interpreting the results. 
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Several indices to measure goodness of fit were used in this study. They are 
presented in the Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4. Fit Indices Used in this Study (Modified from Kline, 2005) 
Fit Index Description Desired Level 
- Known as likelihood ratio chi-square or Smaller 
generalized likelihood ratio (sensitive to 
11:2 (Chi-Square) 
sample size) 
- The discrepancy between the WJrestricted 
sample covariance matrix and the restricted 
covariance matrix 
- Called the Normed chi-square <3.0 
l('tdf 
- The chi-square fit index divided by 
degrees of freedom to reduce the sensitivity 
to samole size 
- The very first standardized fit index >0.9 
Absolute 
GFI 
(J<lreskog & S<!rbom, 1981) and originally 
Fix Indexes 
(Goodness of Fit 
associated with LISREL 
- Analogous to a squared multiple Index) 
correlation (R2), but the GFI is a matrix 
orooortion of e=lained variance. 
AGFI 
- Adjusted by the ratio of degrees of >0.8 
(Adjusted 
freedom for the proposed model to the 
Goodness 
degrees of freedom for the null model 
of Fit Index) 
- Correcting downward the value of the GFI 
based on model complexity. 
RMR. - A measure of the mean absolute value of <0.05 
(Root Mean Square the covariance residuals. 
Residual) 
Parsimony-
RMSEA - Explaining the error of approximation in <0.05: good 
(Root Mean the population fit 
Adjusted 
Square Error of 0.05-0.08: 
Index Annroximation) acceptable fit 
- Statistics between zero and one that >0.90 
NFI compare the proposed model to the null 
(Normed Fit Index) model 
- Samole based 
Incremental 





- Originally associated with EQS >0.90 
(Comparative Fit 
- Value (0-1) are derived from the 
comparison of a hypothesized model with 
Index) 
the null model 
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(5) Measurement Model Fit 
The first confirmatory factor analysis examined the seven constructs with 41 items 
included in the research model and previously examined with exploratory factor 
analysis. Table 4-5 shows mixed results for the fit of measurement model. 
Goodness of Fit Index was below the recommended values of 0.90 (Gefen et al. 
2000) in the U.S (0.796) and South Korea (0.772). Adjusted Goodness of Fit 
Index was also below the value of 0.80 in the U.S. (0.768) and South Korea 
(0.742). In both countries, Normed Fit Index was lower than the expected value of 
0.90. Non-Normed Fit Index was acceptable in the U.S. (0.927), but not in South 
Korea (0.898). Comparative Fit Index was acceptable in both. 
These model fit results indicated that the measurement model is poor. To 
improve overall model fit for both countries, this study dropped thirteen items5 
because ofa lower than 0.70 of standardized factor loading (Hair et al. 1998), and 
high modification index which indicates high error correlation. 0. 70 is minimum 
value of recommended standardized factor loading (Hair et al. 1998). After 
conducting the second confirmatory factor analysis, Adjusted Goodness of Fit 
Index, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, Normed Fit Index, Non-
Normed Fit Index, and Comparative Fit Index were found acceptable for the U.S. 
and South Korea; therefore, the second model had a highly improved model fit. 
Although Goodness of Fit Index and Root Mean Square Residual did not have 
desired fit levels, this study assumed that the measurement model is good in the 
U.S. and South Korea. The Goodness of Fit indices of the initial model and 
5 Dropped are CFl, CF4, IFl, IF4, IFS, SF2, KSl, PRSl, PRS4, TA2, TA5, IAI, and IA5. 
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revised model are presented in Table 4-5. 
Table 4-5. Goodness of Fit indices for the Measurement Model 
Initial Model Revised Model Desired 
Level 
U.S 
South u.s South 
Korea Korea 
Total Nwnber 41 28 ofitems · 
r: 1860.048 1960.348 648.733 817.112 Smaller 
df 758 758 329 329 -
x,2/df 2.454 2.586 1.972 2.484 <3.0 
GFI .796 .772 .887 .843 >0.9 
AGFI .768 .741 .861 .807 >0.8 
RMR .096 .110 .075 .088 <0.05 
RMSEA .064 .070 .052 .067 <0.08 
NFI .892 .856 .943 .909 >0.90 
NNFI .927 .898 .967 .935 >0.90 
CFI .933 .906 .971 .944 >0.90 
( 6) Unidimensionality and Convergent Validity 
The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was completed with maximum likelihood 
estimation. CFA allows the a priori specification of the relationships between the 
latent variables and their indicators. Unidimensionality and convergent validity 
ensure that all items measure a single underlying construct (Bagozzi & Fornell, 
1982). Modifications were based on factor loadings and modification indices. 
Standardized factor loadings were expected to meet the minimum recommended 
value of 0.70, which indicate that the indicator reliability is over 0.50 (Hair et al. 
1998), thus items with lower than 0.7 standardized factor loading were dropped. 
Factor loading and squared multiple correlation for each variable follow. 
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a. Computer Familiarity 
After dropping CF7 (Reading Magazine) from EFA, seven indicators remained to 
measure computer familiarity. The t-values were significant at the 0.05 level. CFl 
(Latest Hardware) and CF4 (Latest Software) were dropped because of their 
contents asking about practical behavior and CFl was lower than 0.7 in South 
Korea. The values for the standardized factor loadings, which determine the 
relative importance of the observed variables as indicators of computer familiarity, 
showed relatively high loadings ranging from 0.811 to 0.913 in U.S and 0.808 to 
0.904 in South Korea. The squared multiple correlation (SMC) refers to the extent 
to which the indicator explains the variable, which is similar to R2 in the 
regression model. SMC ranged from 0.658 to 0.834 and 0.653 to 0.816 in the U.S 
and South Korea, respectively. The results of computer familiarity are presented in 
Table 4-6. 
Table 4-6. Factor Loading and Squared Multiple Correlation of Computer 
Familiaritv 
U.S South Korea 
Item Factor 
SMC Factor SMC LoaclinE! LoaclinE! 
ChanoinE! Hardware (CF2) 0.854 0.729 0.880 0.774 
Hardware Familiaritv (CF3) 0.873 0.763 0.893 0.797 
Chanmnn Software (CFS) 0.883 0.780 0.904 0.816 
Software Familiaritv /CF6) 0.913 0.834 0.898 0.807 
Comouter Familiaritv (CF8) 0.811 0.658 0.808 0.653 
Table 4-7. Scale Refinement of Computer Familiarity 
Nation Items 
# df x' x'idf RMSEA OF! AGFI CF! items p 
U.S 
CFl...6, 8 7 14 244.210 0.000 17.444 0.215 0.859 0.719 0.900 
CF2,3,5,6,8 5 5 65.161 0.000 13.032 0.184 0.941 0.822 0.962 
South CFl...6, 8 7 14 273.069 0.000 19.505 0.238 0.827 0.653 0.877 
Korea CF2,3,5,6,8 5 5 123.732 0.000 24.746 0.269 0.864 0.593 0.926 
(I) The initial model does not show satisfuctory results. Modification index (U.S.: 121.45, 
South Korea: 71.032) indicated a high error correlation between CFl and CF4. Both CFl 
and CF4 were dropped because of their contents asking about practical behavior. 
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b. Internet Familiarity 
Six indicators were used to measure Internet familiarity. The t-values were 
significant at the 0.05 level. IFI (Search Engines) in both countries, IF4 
(Purchasing Products) in the U.S., and IFS (Reading Articles) in South Korea were 
lower than 0. 7 of factor loading and thus dropped. After dropping three items, a 
second CFA was conducted. Standardized factor loadings ranged from 0.869 to 
0.920 in the U.S and 0.742 to 0.861 in South Korea. Squared multiple correlation 
ranged from 0.755 to 0.846 and 0.551 to 0.741 in the U.S and South Korea, 
respectively. The results oflnternet familiarity are showed in Table 4-8. 
Table 4-8. Factor Loading and Squared Multiple Correlation of Internet 
F T . am11antv 
u.s South Korea 
Item Factor 
SMC Factor SMC Loading Loadim> 
Email Use (IF2) .869 0.755 .742 0.551 
Searching Information (IF3) .920 0.846 .861 0.741 
Internet Familiarity (IF6) .900 0.811 .832 0.693 
Table 4-9. Scale Refinement of Internet Familiarity 
Nation Items # df x' items p x'tdf RMSEA OF! AOFI CF! 
IFI... IF6 6 9 45.725 0.000 5.081 0.049 0.956 0.898 0.975 u.s 
IF2, 3, 6 0 4 
South IF!... IF6 6 9 52.792 0.000 5.866 0.063 0.941 0.861 0.958 
Korea IF2, 3, 6 4 0 
(1) In the U.S. high error correlation was found between IF4 and IFS (MI: 20.179) and 
between IF3 and IF4 (MI: 15.008). In South Korea, high error correlation was found 
between IFl and IF3 (16.200) and between IFS and IF6 (MllS.410). 
(2) Although the model shows satisfactory fit, IF!, IF4, and IFS were dropped because of 
low factor loading: IFl (U.S.: 0.677, South Korea: 0.685), IF4 (U.S.: 0.585), and IFS 
(South Korea: 0.690) 
(3) Statistical fit cannot be obtained from only three items (0 of degree of freedom). 
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c. Security Familiarity 
After dropping SF! (Privacy Violation) from EFA, six items remained to measure 
security familiarity. The t-values were significant at the 0.05 level. High error 
correlation was found between SF2 (Protective Knowledge) and SF3 (Security 
Technology) and between SF2 (Protective Knowledge) and SF5 (Computer 
Security) in both countries. Thus, SF2 was dropped in the interest of parsimony. 
After dropping SF2, standardized factor loadings were high, ranging from 0. 914 to 
0.951 in the U.S and 0.871 to 0.937 in South Korea. Squared multiple correlation 
ranged from 0.835 to 0.905 and 0.759 to 0.877 in the U.S and South Korea, 
respectively. The results of security familiarity are presented in Table 4-10. 
Table 4-10. Factor Loading and Squared Multiple Correlation of Security 
F T . am, 1ar1tv 
u.s South Korea 
Item Factor 
SMC Factor Loading Loading SMC 
Security Technology (SF3) .929 0.863 .871 0.759 
Information Security (SF 4) .939 0.882 .930 0.864 
Computer Security (SF5) .951 0.905 .937 0.877 
Internet Security (SF6) .914 0.835 .918 0.843 
Security Familiarity (SF7) .947 0.896 .915 0.838 
Table 4-11. Scale Refinement of Security Familiarity 
Nation Items # df x' items p •,.2/df RMSEA OF! AOFI CF! 
SF2 ... SF7 6 u.s 9 96.518 0.000 10.724 0.165 0.916 0.804 0.972 
SF3 ... SF7 5 5 49.410 0.000 9.882 0.158 0.946 0.839 0.982 
South SF2 ... SF7 6 9 116.048 0.000 12.894 0.190 0.880 0.721 0.952 
Korea SF3 ... SF7 5 5 89.239 0.000 17.848 0.227 0.898 0.694 0.958 
(I) High error correlation was found between SF2 and SF3 (U.S.:33.375, South Korea: 
19.826) and between SF2 and SF5 (U.S.: 10.944, South Korea: 15.785) so that SF2 was 
dropped in the interest of parsimony. 
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d. Knowledge of Spyware 
Five items were used to measure knowledge of spyware. The t-values were 
significant at the 0.05 level. KSl (Updating Knowledge) was dropped because of 
its low factor loading in South Korea, and because MI showed a high error 
correlation between KSl (Updating Knowledge) and KS2 (Malicious Software). 
After dropping KS I, standardized factor loadings ranged from 0. 798 to 0.953 in 
the U.S and 0.774 to 0.948 in South Korea. Squared multiple correlation ranged 
from 0.637 to 0.908 in the U.S. and 0.599 to 0.898 in South Korea. The results of 
knowledge ofspyware are analyzed in Table 4-12. 
Table 4-12. Factor Loading and Squared Multiple Correlation of Knowledge of 
Snvware 
u.s South Korea 
Item Factor Factor 
Loading SMC Loading SMC 
Malicious Software (KS2) 0.860 0.740 0.780 0.608 
Seeking Advice (KS3) 0.798 0.637 0.774 0.599 
Problem & Results (KS4) 0.921 0.849 0.948 0.898 
Spyware Knowledge (KS5) 0.953 0.908 0.921 0.848 
Table 4-13. Scale Refinement of Knowledge of Spyware 
Nation Items # df x' items p x'ldf RMSEA OF! AGFI CF! 
KSI...KS5 5 5 38.099 0.000 7.620 0.136 0.963 0.888 0.979 
u.s 
KS2 ... KS5 4 2 8.594 0.014 4.297 0.096 0.995 0.985 0.995 
South KSI...KS5 5 5 16.606 0.000 3.321 0.084 0.980 0.939 0.990 
Korea KS2 ... KS5 4 2 0.4 0.819 0.2 0.000 0.999 0.997 1 
(1) Although the initial model shows satisfactory fit, KS 1 was dropped because of its low 
factor loading in South Korea (0.660), and because MI (16.562) showed a high error 
correlation between KS 1 and KS2. 
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e. Perceived Risk of Spyware 
Six items were used to measure perceived risk of spyware. The t-values were 
significant at the 0.05 level. For parsimony of measurement model, PRS 1 (Harm 
to Computers) and PRS4 (Personal Privacy) were dropped. In the second CFA, 
standardized factor loadings were high, ranging from 0.850 to 0.949 in the U.S 
and 0.853 to 0.912 in South Korea. Squared multiple correlation ranged from 
0.723 to 0.901 and 0.727 to 0.831 in the U.S and South Korea, respectively. The 
results of perceived risk ofspyware are presented in Table 4-14. 
Table 4-14. Factor Loading and Squared Multiple Correlation of Perceived Risk of s ' ;pyware 
U.S South Korea 
Item Factor Factor 
Loading SMC Loading SMC 
Computer Risk (PRS2) .935 0.875 .875 0.166 
Personal Information (PRS3) .949 0.901 .881 0.776 
Threat by Spyware (PRS5) .850 0.723 .853 0.727 
Risk of Spyware (PRS6) .917 0.841 .912 0.831 
Table 4-15. Scale Refinement of Perceived Risk of Spyware 
Nation Items # df x' 1.1/df RMSEA GFI AGFI CF! items p 
PRSI...PRS6 6 9 139.183 0.000 15.465 0.202 0.891 0.747 0.948 u.s 
PRS2, 3, 5, 6 4 2 17.18 0.000 8.590 0.146 0.977 0.887 0.990 
South PRSI. .. PRS6 6 9 189.277 0.000 21.031 0.247 0.845 0.638 0,905 
Korea PRS2, 3, 5,6 4 2 39.051 0.000 19.525 0.238 0.939 0.697 0.967 
( 1) Initial model does not show satisfactory model fit. MI indicated high error correlations 
between PRSl and PRS2 (U.S.: 29.878, South Korea: 56.197) and between PRS4 and 
PR5 (U.S.: 53.396, South Korea: 27.566). PRSl and PRS4 were dropped in the interest of 
parsimony. 
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f Trust of Anti-Spyware Programs 
Six items were used to measure trust ofanti-spyware programs. The t-values were 
significant at the 0.05 level. TA2 (Ability 2) and TA5 (Benevolence 2) were 
removed in the interest of parsimony of the study. After dropping two items, 
standardized factor loadings ranged from 0.784 to 0.933 in the U.S and 0.782 to 
0.916 in South Korea. Squared multiple correlation ranged from 0.614 to 0.871 
and 0.612 to 0.839 in the U.S and South Korea, respectively. The results of trust of 
anti-spyware programs are listed in Table 4-16. 
Table 4-16. Factor Loading and Squared Multiple Correlation of Trust of Anti-
Spyware Programs 
U.S South Korea 
Item Factor Factor 
Loading SMC Loading SMC 
Ability 1 (TAI) .784 0.614 .801 0.642 
Integrity (TA3) .933 0.871 .916 0.839 
Benevolence I (TA4) .860 0.739 .782 0.612 
Trust (TA6) .875 0.766 .796 0.634 
Table 4-17. Scale Refinement of Trust of Anti-Spyware Programs 
Nation Items # elf x' items p x'tdf RMSEA GFI AGFI CF! 
TAI...TA6 6 9 110.766 0.000 12.307 0.178 0.907 0.783 0.949 u.s 
24.575 12.287 0.968 0.848 TAI, 3,4, 6 4 2 0.000 0.178 0.980 
South TAI...TA6 6 9 117.162 0.000 13.018 0.191 0.880 0.720 0.934 
Korea TAI, 3, 4, 6 4 2 9.760 0.008 4.880 0.109 0.985 0.924 0.990 
(1) MI md1cated high error correlations between TAI and TA2 (U.S.: 24.638, South 
Korea: 30.369) and between TA3 and TA5 (U.S.: 18.349, South Korea: 6.999). TA5 also 
had high error correlations with TA4 (MI: 21.798) and TA6 (MI: 43.128) in South Korea. 
Thus, TA2 and TA5 were dropped in the interest of parsimony. 
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g. Intention to Adopt Anti-Spyware Programs 
Five items were used to measure intention to adopt anti-spyware programs. The t-
values were significant at the 0.05 level. IA5 (Multiple Use) was dropped because 
of lower than 0.7 of standardized factor loading in South Korea. Also, IAl 
(Likelihood of Use) was removed for parsimony of the study. Standardized factor 
loadings ranged from 0.856 to 0.957 in the U.S and 0.836 to 0.949 in South Korea. 
Squared multiple correlation ranged from 0.733 to 0.916 and 0.699 to 0.901 in the 
U.S and South Korea, respectively. The results of intention to adopt anti-spyware 
programs are showed in Table 4-18. 
Table 4-18. Factor Loading and Squared Multiple Correlation of Intention to 
Adopt Anti-Spyware Programs 
U.S South Korea 
Item Factor Factor 
Loading SMC Loading SMC 
Prediction of Use (IA2) .889 0.790 .920 0.847 
Intention to Use (IA3) .957 0.916 .949 0.901 
Recommending to Others (IS4) .856 0.733 .836 0.699 
Table 4-19. Scale Refinement of Intention to Adopt Anti-Spyware Programs 
Nation Items # df x' items p x'tdf RMSEA GFI AGFI CF! 
u.s IAI...IAS 5 5 45.340 0.000 9.068 0.151 0.952 0.856 0.978 
IA2 ... IA4• 3 0 
South IAI...IAS 5 5 53.110 0.000 10.622 0.171 0.939 0.817 0.969 
Korea IA2 ... IA4• 3 0 
(1) IAl had high error correlations with IA2 (U.S.: 9.905, South Korea: 5.613) and IA4 
(South Korea: 12.294). Thus IAl was dropped for parsimony. 
(2) MI indicated high error correlation between IA4 and IA5 (U.S.: 25.309, South Korea: 
17.292). IA5 also had low factor loading in South Korea (0.552), and thus it was dropped. 
(3) Statistical fit cannot be obtained from only three items (0 of degree of freedom) 
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(7) Internal Consistency 
The internal consistency of each construct was measured by examining estimates 
of composite reliability and variance extracted (Hair et al. 1998). Composite 
reliability refers to the extent to which the construct is represented by the 
indicators. It is computed conformance with the formula described by Werts et al. 
(1974). Compared to Cronbach's alpha, which provides a lower bound estimate of 
the internal consistency, the composite reliability is a more rigorous estimate for 
the reliability (Chin & Gopal, 1995). The overall amount of variance in the 
indicators accounted for by the variable reflects the extent to which the indicators 
are truly representative of the construct (Bassellier et al, 2003). 
The recommended values of composite reliability for acceptable model 
reliability are above 0.70 (Werts, Linn, & Joreskog, 1974; Gefen, Straub, & 
Boudreau, 2000) and for strong reliability are above 0.80 (Koufteros, 1999). All 
results in the U.S. and South Korea, as presented in Table 4-20, exceeded or 
converged the recommended value of 0. 7 for composite reliability and of 0.5 for 
variance explained (Hair et al. 1998). 
Table 4-20. Reliability and Variance Extracted 
# u.s South Korea Variable 
items Variance Variance Reliability Extracted Reliability Extracted 
Computer Familiarity 5 0.832 0.498 0.857 0.546 
Internet Familiarity 3 0.942 0.844 0.803 0.577 
Security Familiarity 5 0.942 0.763 0.949 0.787 
Knowledge of Spyware 4 0.826 0.544 0.833 0.558 
Perceived Risk of Spyware 4 0.886 0.662 0.859 0.604 
Trust of Anti-Spyware 
4 0.887 0.664 0.837 0.562 Pro=ms 
Intention to Adopt Anti-
3 0.847 0.650 0.857 0.667 Sovware Pro,mnns 
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(8) Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which the measures for each construct 
are distinctively different from each other. It is generally assessed by testing 
whether the correlations between pairs of dimensions are significantly different 
from unity (Anderson & Gerbing, 1998). Following Fornell and Lacker (1981), 
discriminant validity was tested. Because the squared correlations between 
constructs were lower than variance extracted, constructs are distinct. The results 
are presented in Table 4-21 and 4-22. 
Table 4-21. Correlations and Discriminant Validity in the U.S. 
CF IF SF KS PRS TA IA 
Computer Familiarity 0.498* 
Internet Familiarity 0.368 0.844* 
Security Familiarity 0.735 0.424 0.763* 
Knowledge of Spyware 0.763 0.246 0.752 0.544* 
Perceived Risk of 
0.387 0.304 0.383 0.481 0.662* 
Sovware 
Trust of Anti-Spyware 
0.432 0.314 0.355 0.476 0.510 0.664* Pro=m• 
Intention to Adopt Anti-
0.518 0.317 0.444 0.600 0.564 0.622 0.650* Spyware Pro!!IllIIlS 
* Variance extracted; others correlation coefficient 
Table 4-22. Correlations and Discriminant Validity in South Korea 
CF IF SF KS PRS TA 1A 
Computer Familiarity 0.546* 
Internet Familiarity 0.245 0.577* 
Security Familiarity 0.592 0.259 0.787* 
Knowledge of Spyware 0.653 0.085 0.579 0.558* 
Perceived Risk of 
0.352 0.327 0.312 0.424 0.604* 
Sovware 
Trust of Anti-Spyware 
0.294 0.209 0.299 0.347 0.316 0.562* Pro1m1m< 
Intention to Adopt Anti-
0.303 0.224 0.290 0.382 0.376 0.630 0.667* 
Spyware Pro= 
• * Variance extracted; others correlation coefficient 
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4. Structural Model 
Using a revised measurement model, structural equation modeling (SEM) was 
conducted to test the hypothesized relationships. This study hypothesized that 
technology familiarity, knowledge of spyware, perceived risk of spyware, and 
trust of anti-spyware programs directly impact intention to adopt anti-spyware 
programs. 
(I) Initial Model 









U.S./South Korea, Bold means variance explained 
* p <.05, **p<0.01, ***p <.001 
---· Significant in Both 
--------► Non-Significant in Both 
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The model in Figure 4-1 explained 54% of U.S. respondents and 45% of South 
Korean respondents' intention to adopt anti-spyware programs. Although general 
technology familiarity was not a direct indicator of anti-spyware adoption 
intention, this was a meaningful result because this study was designed to find 
factors which maximize the explanation in the variance of the dependent variable. 
Knowledge of spyware was also explained by 67% of U.S. respondents and 
49% in South Korean respondents by general technology familiarity, as well. 
Although significance resulted, Internet familiarity was not supported in the U.S. 
because of the resulting negative relationship instead of the suggested positive 
relationship. Internet familiarity was not significant in South Korea. On the other 
hand, computer familiarity and security familiarity were significant dimensions of 
general technology familiarity in the U.S. and South Korea. Hypotheses related to 
technology familiarity were not significant at the p<0.05 level except Hl (General 
Technology Familiarity -> Knowledge of Spyware) in U.S and South Korea. 
Other hypotheses were significant in the U.S. and South Korea except H7 
(Knowledge of Spyware-> Intention to Adopt Anti-Spyware Programs) in South 
Korea. Table 4-23 presents the standardized path coefficients and statistical 
significance of the structural model in U.S and South Korea. 
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Table 4-23. Standardized Path Coefficients and Significances oflnitial Model 
U.S (N=357) South Korea (N=326) 
Path Standardized Standardized 
Path Statistical Path Statistical 
Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Computer Familiarity 
--+ 0.576 *** 0.689 *** 
General Technoloov Familiaritv 
Internet Familiarity 
--+ -0.127 .009** -0.091 .166 
General Technoloov Familiarity 
Security Familiarity 
--+ 0.548 * "" 0.449 *** 
General Technoloev Familiaritv 
General Technology 
HI Familiarity --+ 0.817 *"" 0.701 *** 
Knowledee of S 
General Technology 
H2 Familiarity --+ 0.011 .907 0.131 .131 
Perceived Risk of Soyware 
General Technology 
H3 Familiarity--+ 0.042 .629 0.118 .107 Trust of Anti-Spyware 
Pro=m• 
General Technology 
H4 Familiarity --+ 0.009 .897 0.007 .921 Intention to Adopt Anti-
Sovware Pro=ms 
Knowledge of Spyware 
HS --+ 0.472 *** 0.341 *** 
Perceived Risk of Sovware 
Knowledge of Spyware --+ 
H6 Trust of Anti-Spyware 0.266 .004** 0.172 .041* 
Pro=m• 
Knowledge of Spyware --+ 
H7 Intention to Adopt Anti- 0.314 "** 0.127 .070 
Sovware Prol!TI!llls 
Perceived Risk of Spyware --+ 
HS Trust of Anti-Spyware 0.365 *** 0.197 .002** 
Programs 
Perceived Risk of Spyware --+ 
H9 Intention to Adopt Anti- 0.230 **" 0.150 .004** 
s .. Pro=ms 
Trust of Anti-Spyware 
HIO Programs --+ 0.351 Intention to Adopt Anti- "** 0.537 *** 
s PrOl!TillllS 
* p <.05, **p<0.01, ***p <.001 
(2) Revised Model 
Security 
Familiarity 
Figure 4-2. Revised Structural Model 
.42***/.3~ 
~ .65/.48 
U.S./South Korea, Bold means variance explained 
* p <.05, **p<0.01, ***p <.001 
---- Significant in Both 
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This study used reflective indicators and formative dimensions (Petter et al. 2007) 
to measure multidimensional general technology familiarity. Although Internet 
familiarity had a positive correlation with computer familiarity and security 
familiarity, Internet familiarity was a significantly negative dimension in the U.S.; 
and it was not significant in South Korea. Also, general technology familiarity 
only significantly influences knowledge of spyware (HI). The modification index 
showed that Internet Familiarity----> Perceived Risk of Spyware (MI: 13.533) and 
Internet Familiarity ----> Trust of Anti-Spyware Programs (MI: 6.916) in the U.S. 
and Internet Familiarity ----> Perceived Risk of Spyware (MI: 23.619) in South 
Korea, which exceeded 3.84 of MI, suggesting that adding that path may 
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significantly improve model fit (Hair et al. 1998). Thus, this study presented a 
second structural model. Because technology familiarity was not significant for 
H2 (General Technology Familiarity--+ Perceived Risk of Spyware), H3 (General 
Technology Familiarity --+ Trust of Anti-Spyware Programs), and H4 (General 
Technology Familiarity --+ Intention to Adopt Anti-Spyware Programs) in the 
initial structural model, the revised structural model no longer incorporated the 
formative dimension for multidimensional technology familiarity. Based on 
modification index, this study separately examined the relationships for computer 
familiarity, Internet familiarity, and security familiarity. Thus, this analysis yielded 
four new hypotheses: 
NH 1: Internet familiarity is positively related to perceived risk of spyware. 
NH2: Internet familiarity is positively related to trust of anti-spyware programs. 
NH3: Computer familiarity is positively related to knowledge of spyware. 
NH4: Security familiarity is positively related to knowledge of spyware. 
In the revised structural model, all ten hypotheses, including the four new 
hypotheses, were significant at the p < 0.05 level in the U.S. and South Korea. 
Standardized path coefficients and significances of revised model were presented 
in Table 4-24. 
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Table 4°24. Standardized Path Coefficients and Significances of Revised Model 
U.S (N=357) South Korea (N=326) 
Path Standardized Standardized 
Path Statistical Path Statistical 
Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
NH Internet Familiarity 
-+ 0.192 *** 0.288 *** 1 
Perceived Risk of Snvware 
NH Internet Familiarity -+ 
2 
TIUStofAnti-Spyware 0.141 0.007** 0.139 .026* 
Pro=me 
NH Computer Familiarity 
-+ 0.453 *** 0.477 *** 3 
Knowled1>e of Snvware 
NH Security Familiarity 
-+ 0.415 *** 0.298 *** 4 Know!edue of Sn.mme 
Knowledge of Spyware 
HS -+ 0.427 *** 0.393 *** 
Perceived Risk of Snvware 
Knowledge of Spyware -+ 
H6 Trust of Anti-Spyware 0.278 *** 0.27 *** 
Pro=me 
Knowledge of Spyware -+ 
H7 Intention to Adopt Anti- 0.321 *** 0.131 .015* 
s Pro=m< 
Perceived Risk of Spyware --+ 
HS Trust of Anti-Spyware 0.332 *"* 0.154 .021* 
Pro=ms 
Perceived Risk of Spyware -+ 
H9 Intention to Adopt Anti- 0.230 *** 0.152 .004** 
Snvumre Programs 
Trust of Anti-Spyware 
HlO Programs-+ 0.351 Intention to Adopt Anti- **" 0.537 *** 
Snvware Pro=m• 
* p <.05, **p<0.01, ***p <.001 
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(3) Model Fit of Structural Model 
The initial model fit was compared to the revised model fit. The initial model and 
the revised model both had acceptable indexes of Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index 
(AGFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Normed Fit Index 
(NFI), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI). Overall, 
in the revised model, the fit was slightly increased. Thus, this study adopted the 
revised model to describe anti-spyware program adoption. Goodness of Fit indices 
was presented in Table 4-25. 
Table 4-25. Goodness-of Fit indices for the Initial and Revised Structural Model 




U.S South Level 
Korea Korea 
r--2 682.730 850.266 668.525 826.784 Smaller 
df 335 335 337 337 -
'"l/df 2.038 2.538 1.984 2.453 <3.0 
GFI 0.881 0.836 0.884 0.842 >0.9 
AGFI 0.856 0.802 0.860 0.810 >0.8 
RMR 0.096 0.115 0.087 0.096 <0.05 
RMSEA 0.054 0.068 0.053 0.067 <0.08 
NFI 0.940 0.906 0.941 0.908 >0.90 
NNFI 0.964 0.933 0.966 0.936 >0.90 
CFI 0.968 0.940 0.970 0.943 >0.90 
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Table 4-26 and Table 4-27 display the results of hypothesis testing of initial and 
revised structural model. 
Table 4-26. Results ofHypothesis Testing oflnitial Structural Model 




General technology familiarity is positively 
Supported Supported related to the knowledge of spyware. 
H2 General technology familiarity is positively Not Not 
related to perceived risk of spyware. Suooorted Supported 
H3 
General technology familiarity is positively Not Not 
related to trust of anti-spyware proarams. Supported Supported 
H4 
General technology familiarity is positively Not Not 
related to adoption intention. Supported Supported 
HS 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to 
Supported Supported oerceived risk of spyware. 
H6 Knowledge of spyware is positively related to 
trust of anti-spvware proITTams. Supported Supported 
H7 Knowledge of spyware is positively related to Supported Not adoption intention. Supported 
H8 Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to Supported Supported trust of anti-spyware programs. 
H9 Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to Supported Supported adoption intention. 
HlO Trust of anti-spyware programs is positively Supported Supported related to adoption intention. 
Significant differences exist m anti-spyware 
Hll adoption attitude between the U.S. and South Supported 
Korea. 
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Table 4-27. Results of Hypothesis Testing ofRevised Structural Model 
Num Hypothesis U.S. 
South 
Korea 
Internet familiarity IS positively related to Supported Supported NHl 
perceived risk of spvware. 
NH2 Internet familiarity is positively related to trust of Supported Supported 
anti-spyware programs. 
Computer familiarity is positively related to Supported Supported NH3 
knowledge of spvware 
NH4 
Security familiarity is positively related to Supported Supported 
knowledge of spyware 
HS 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to Supported Supported 
perceived risk of spvware. 
H6 
Knowledge of spyware is positively related to Supported Supported 
trust of anti-spyware programs. 
H7 Knowledge of spyware is positively related to Supported Supported 
adoption intention. 
HS 
Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to Supported Supported 
· trust of anti-spyware programs. 
H9 
Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to Supp~rted Supported 
adoption intention. 
HlO 
Trust of anti-spyware programs is positively Support~d Supported 
related to adoption intention. 
Significant differences exist in anti-spyware 
H11 adoption attitude between the U.S. and South Supported 
Korea. 
In chapter 5, this study presents discussion of the results, implications, limitations, 
and conclusions of the study. 
Chapter5 
Discussion and Conclusion 
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Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the results, implications for researchers, 
business practitioners, and educators, limitations, and conclusions of the study. 
1. Discussion of Results 
In this study, several constructs were adopted and modified from previous studies, 
and then, statistical methods ( exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor 
analysis, and structural equation modeling) were used to examine the impact of 
the variables in anti-spyware program adoption. The hypothesized model was 
developed to explain the relationship between constructs. In the following section, 
the results are discussed. 
General Technology Familiarity 
In the initial structural model, general technology familiarity was only positively 
significant to knowledge ofspyware. (U.S: p6 = 0.817, p<0.001, South Korea: p = 
0.701, p<0.001) while not significant to perceived risk ofspyware (U.S: p = 0.011, 
p=0.907, South Korea: p = 0.131, p=0.131), trust ofanti-spyware programs (U.S: 
6 P represents a standardized path coefficient, which is used to examine the causal 
relationship between constructs. p can be compared to assess the relative effects of 
the constructs within the structural model. The higher value means the higher 
effect size. 
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p = 0.042, p=0.629, South Korea: p = 0.118, p=0.107), and intention to adopt anti-
spyware programs (U.S: p = 0.009, p=0.897, South Korea: P = 0.007, p=0.921). 
This study suggests that general technology familiarity is so general that it cannot 
directly affect behavior intention, meaning that a mediator ( e.g. knowledge) is 
needed to affect behavior intention. 
This study used the formative construct ( computer, Internet, security 
familiarity) to examine multiple dimensions of general technology familiarity. 
Contrary to the expectation, internet familiarity (IJ.S: P = -0.127, p=0.009, South 
Korea: p = -0.091, p=0. 166) was not positively significant dimension of general 
knowledge familiarity. In the same vein, compared with computer and security 
familiarity, the mean of Internet familiarity was high. It can be explained, in 
general cases, that computer users are highly familiar with Internet, so that 
Internet familiarity cannot be examined with computer and security familiarity in 
general technology familiarity. In the meantime, the modification index indicated 
that Internet familiarity positively influences perceived risk of spyware and trust 
of anti-spyware programs. Therefore, this study separately examined computer, 
Internet and security familiarity, not in one construct, and then tested the revised 
structural model. The following is the results and discussions of the revised 
structural model 
New Hypothesis 1: Internet familiarity is positively related to perceived risk of 
spyware. 
New Hypothesis 2: Internet Familiarity is positively related to trust of anti-
spyware programs. 
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Internet familiarity was found to have a positive influence on the perceived 
risk ofspyware (U.S: p = 0.192, p<0.001, South Korea: p = 0.288, p<0.001) and 
trust ofanti-spyware programs (U.S: p = 0.141, p=0.007, South Korea: p = 0.139, 
p=0.026). Unlike computer and security familiarity, Internet familiarity did not 
significantly influence knowledge of spyware. A possible explanation is that 
individuals could access spyware and anti-spyware programs through Internet 
usage. They possibly perceive risk of spyware and trust of anti-spyware programs 
without knowledge of spyware. 
This study concludes that general knowledge of the Internet influences 
negative belief of spyware and positive belief of anti-spyware programs, 
supporting the argument that knowledge influence belief (Jasperson, et al. 2003). 
New Hypothesis 3: Computer familiarity is positively related to the knowledge of 
spyware. 
New Hypothesis 4: Security familiarity is positively related to the Knowledge of 
Spyware. 
Computer familiarity (U.S: p = 0.453, p<0.001, South Korea: p = 0.477, 
p<0.001) and Security Familiarity (U.S: p = 0.415, p<0.001, South Korea: p = 
0.298, p<0.001) were found to be a significant and positive predictor of the 
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knowledge of spyware in both the U.S. and South Korea. Also, a large part of the 
variance in knowledge of spyware (U.S: 65%, South Korea: 48%) was explained 
by computer familiarity and security familiarity. The results indicate that relatively 
general knowledge ( computer and security) is an important determinant of specific 
knowledge (spyware). 
Hypothesis 5: Knowledge of spyware is positively related to perceived risk of 
spyware 
Hypothesis 6: Knowledge of spyware is positively related to trust of anti-spyware 
programs 
Hypothesis 7: Knowledge of spyware is positively related to adoption intention. 
Knowledge of spyware was found to be a significant and positive predictor of 
perceived risk of spyware (U.S.: p =0.427, p<0.001, South Korea: p =0.393, 
p<0.001), trust ofanti-Spyware programs (U.S.: p =0.278, p<0.001, South Korea: 
p =0.270, p<0.001), and intention to adopt anti-spyware programs (U.S.: p =0.321, 
p<0.001, South Korea: p =0.131, p=0.015). 
These results support the Dinev and Hu's finding that the key predictor of 
protective technology adoption (anti-spyware programs) is awareness of negative 
technology (spyware). Also, this study supports that knowledge is a determinant 
of intent to act (Gefen at al. 2003, Roger, 1995). This study shows that knowledge 
of negative technology influences two beliefs: perceived risk of negative 
technology and trust of protective technology, helping to confirm that knowledge 
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is a predictor ofbelief(Jasperson et al. 2003). 
Also, this study addresses the relationship between knowledge behavior 
intention in the initial and revised structural models. In the initial structural model, 
knowledge to behavior intention was positively significant in the U.S. (P =0.314, 
p<0.001 ), but not in South Korea (P =0.127, p=0.070). The possible explanation is 
type I error, occurring when a researcher believes there is a genuine effect in the 
population when in fact there isn't. In the revised model, knowledge to behavior 
intention show relatively high different effect size, while knowledge to perceived 
risk and trust show similar effect sizes in the U.S. and South Korea. Knowledge 
could be an important predictor of behavior intention in the U.S. 
Hypothesis 8: Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to frost of anti-
spyware programs 
Hypothesis 9: Perceived risk of spyware is positively related to adoption intention. 
Perceived risk of spyware was found to be a significant and positive predictor 
of trust of anti-spyware programs (U.S.: p =0.332, p<0.001, South Korea: p 
=0.154, p=0.021) and intention to adopt anti-spyware programs (U.S.: p =0.230, 
p<0.001, South Korea: p =0.152, p=0.004). H8 supports the saying that "the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend". H9 supports the role of risk as a predictor of 
intention to adopt protective technology. 
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Hypothesis JO: Trust of anti-spyware programs is positively related to adoption 
intention 
Trust of anti-spyware programs was found to be a significant and positive 
predictor of intention to adopt anti-spyware programs (U.S.: ~ =0.351, p<0.001, 
South Korea: ~ =0.537, p<0.001). Hl0 supports that trust is a predictor of 
intention to act (Bhattacherjee, 2002; Gefen et al, 2003). 
Hypothesis 11: Significant differences exist in anti-spyware adoption attitude 
between the U.S. and South Korea. 
Regarding all constructs, the U.S. results were significant stronger than South 
Korea at the 0.05 level. Possible explanations regarding Korean's low 
consciousness of security are discussed next. 
Compared to the rate of high speed internet penetration, Koreans' security 
consciousness is very low (Kim, 2004). Korean Internet users recognize the issue 
of personal information privacy and know how to prevent their privacy, but they 
do not intend to act to prevent the danger (Kil, 2008). This phenomenon is 
reflected by the low rate of anti-virus program usage in South Korea. Compared 
with the U.S. (71%) and Japan (74%), the rate of anti-virus program usage in 
Korea is 38% (Kim, 2004). 
The results of the current study showed that 66.9% U.S. respondents used 
anti-spyware programs while 52.6% Korean respondents used anti-spyware 
programs. Some researchers presented cultural aspects regarding Koreans' low 
security and privacy concerns. According to Sung (2004), Koreans have been in a 
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unified community with large family systeqis and have had rare chances at privacy. 
For example, although somebody opens another person's private mail, he or she 
does not realize that it is a severe privacy infringement. 
2. Implications 
The findings of this study contribute to the body of work on protective technology 
adoption for practitioners, researchers, and educators. 
For practitioners, the findings of this study will help online firms and anti-
spyware sites. Online firms will be able to provide solutions to protect consumers 
from negative technologies such as viruses and spyware, therefore reliving users' 
concern. This, in turn, will enhance consumers' trust in Web sites. Furthermore, 
anti-spyware sites can more effectively develop their Web sites by providing users 
with online education in local and global aspects. 
This study determined the predictors of anti-spyware program adoption. In the 
context of protective technology adoption, Dinev and Hu (2007) argued that 
conventional motivational factors such as perceived usefulness and perceived ease 
of use become less meaningful or at least less significant. Also, awareness of 
negative technology is an important predictor of intention to adopt protective 
technology. This study extended the anti-spyware adoption research of previous 
studies. This study also found that computer and security familiarity are important 
predictors ofknowledge ofspyware. 
The extended theory of user behavior presented in this study is not bound to 
protective technology adoption. Knowledge of technologies or knowledge of 
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problems and the ways to solve the problems will be significant to a wide range of 
innovation at individual, organizational, and interorganizational level (Dinev & 
Hu, 2007). This study also contributes to individual's knowledge and behavior 
toward spyware. 
This study identified the relationships between familiarity and knowledge. 
Although computer and security familiarity are important predictors of knowledge 
of spyware, they do not significantly influence protective technology adoption. 
This study assumes that the familiarity is too general to influence intention to act. 
In order to influence user behavior, relatively specific knowledge is required. 
This study also found that the research model adopted in the U.S can be used 
in South Korea. 
Finally, the findings also contribute to knowledge and security education. 
Based on the findings of this study, educators can teach general information which 
influence specific knowledge. Also, this study will help educators design relevant 
security information systems courses. 
3. Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, this study used a student sample in the 
U.S. and South Korea. However, students can be used effectively as surrogates in 
the context of technology adoption (McKnight et al. 2002). 
Second, using a convenience sample is a limitation in terms of the 
representativeness of the population. This study was based on a convenience 
sample which lacks empirical representativeness to the larger technology user 
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population. 
Third, this study used only one university in each country. In addition to cross 
cultural differences, the two universities have difference backgrounds ( e.g. public 
vs. private and rural vs. suburban). Possible biases from these factors, which this 
study did not consider, could exist. 
Fourth, sample bias could exist in the study. The South Korean sample 
includes 19 .1 % engineering majors which are assumed as being highly familiar 
with computer and Internet. 
Fifth, although this study followed the guideline of cross-cultural research 
(Karahanna et al. 2002), administrative error in translation and survey 
administration may have occurred. Karahanna et al. (2002) suggested that "to 
translate correctly, there is a need to translate to the target language - which needs 
to be performed by a native speaker of the target language-and then back translate 
to the original language, this time by a different native speaker of the original 
language". While the first translation to Korean was conducted by a native Korean, 
translation back to the English by a native was not conducted. Thus, this process 
may have produced possible error in the cross cultural research. 
4. Future Research 
Many opportunities exist for future research related to this study. For example, 
future research could explore other variables which influence protective 
technology adoption. Future research could also examine the relationship of 
demographic variables ( e.g. gender, age, and major) to protective technology 
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adoption. The current study identified two groups (the U.S. and South Korea); 
other comparison groups could be studied in the future. Also, different subjective 
norms in the U.S. and South Korea could be examined. 
Further research could also identify how broad knowledge influences specific 
knowledge. While the research model can be adopted in both the U.S. and South 
Korea, this study found significant differences. Cultural aspects could be explored 
as a determinant of the differences in global IS research. 
4. Conclusion 
Although numerous studies on technology adoption have been conducted, 
research on negative technology and protective technology adoption has been 
limited in information systems research (Dinev & Hu, 2007). Also, cross-cultural 
IS research has been less developed (Karahanna et al. 2002). This study started 
with the need to combine between protective technology adoption and cross-
cultural research between countries. Comparing the U.S. with South Korea, this 
study examined factors of anti-spyware adoption and extended the work of 
previous research. 
This study found that knowledge, perceived risk and trust are important 
predictors of protective technology adoption. Also computer and security 
familiarity are important predictors of knowledge of negative technology such as 
spyware. 
In sum, this study built upon previous research to contribute to technology 
adoption and cross cultural research in information systems. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix A. Descriptive statistics and ANCOVA for individual items 
Code Name U.S. South Korea ANCOVA 
Mean S.D Mean S.D F-value P-value 
CFl Latest Hardware 3.50 1.645 3.64 1.425 .431 .512 
CF2 Changing Hardware 3.90 1.865 3.00 1.681 64.437 .ooo••• 
CF3 Hardware Familiarity 4.06 1.747 3.23 1.640 61.219 .ooo••• 
CF4 Latest Software 3.77 1.691 3.64 1.569 3.484 .062 
CF5 Changing Software 4.22 1.830 3.43 1.820 52.714 .ooo••• 
CF6 Software Familiarity 4.36 1.756 3.52 1.728 59.666 .000*** 
CF7 Reading Magazine 2.29 1.605 2.19 1.476 5.749 .017* 
CFS Computer Familiarity 4.85 1.613 3.76 1.552 93.621 .000*** 
Total Computer Familiarity 3.87 1.428 3.30 1.326 48.028 .000*** 
lFl Search Engines 6.00 1.271 5.30 1.327 51.510 .ooo••• 
IF2 Email Use 6.44 0.896 5.38 1.278 157.447 .ooo••• 
IF3 Searching Information 6.45 0.845 5.72 1.122 93.077 .ooo••• 
IF4 Purchasing Products 5.80 1.440 5.42 1.371 11.469 .001••· 
IFS Reading Articles 6.15 1.163 5.48 1.346 50.694 .ooo••• 
IF6 Internet Familiarity 6.49 0.863 5.64 1.145 115.942 .ooo••• 
Total Internet Familiarity 6.22 0.876 5.49 1.003 102.570 .ooo••• 
SFl Privacy Violation 4.69 1.590 4.15 1.300 25.781 .000*** 
SF2 Protective Knowledge 4.49 1.595 3.50 1.259 86.676 .ooo••• 
SF3 Security Technology 4.26 1.646 3.29 1.241 89.228 .000*** 
SF4 Information Security 4.19 1.624 3.34 1.307 68.473 .000*** 
SFS Computer Security 4.36 1.607 3.43 1.366 85.089 .000*** 
SF6 Internet Security 4.52 1.621 3.43 1.387 104.264 .000*** 
SF7 Security Familiarity 4.31 1.562 3.37 1.351 87.461 .000*** 
Total, Security Familiarity 4.40 1.488 3.50 1.107 94.867 .000*** 
KS! Updating Knowledge 3.24 1.687 2.76 1.499 24.477 .000*** 
KS2 Malicious Software 3.56 1.780 3.21 1.546 17.602 .000*** 
KS3 Seeking Advice 2.93 1.681 2.54 1.490 19.547 .000*** 
KS4 Problem & Results 3.50 1.832 2.74 1.481 53.361 .000*** 
KSS Soyware Knowledge 3.36 1.723 2.80 1.406 37.919 .ooo••• 
Total Knowledge of Spyware 3.32 1.552 2.81 1.273 38.809 .000*** 
PRSI Harm to Computers 4.47 1.60 4.41 1.460 1.529 .217 
PRS2 Computer Risk 4.54 1.587 4.39 1.457 4.839 .028* 
PRS3 Personal Information 4.57 1.584 4.31 1.466 9.696 .002** 
PRS4 Personal Privacy 4.39 1.653 4.29 1.510 2.753 .098 
PRSS Threat by Spyware 4.40 1.630 4.34 1.532 1.477 .225 
PRS6 Risk of Spyware 4.67 1.612 4.50 1.579 5.034 .025* 
Total Perceived Risk of Spyware 4.51 1.471 4.37 1.313 4.671 .031* 
TAI Ability I 4.46 1.268 4.06 
TA2 Ability 2 4.69 1.259 3.91 
TA3 Integrity 4.39 1.209 3.86 
TA4 Benevolence I 4.32 1.215 3.59 
TA5 Benevolence 2 4.46 1.219 3.77 
TA6 Trust 4.40 1.178 3.79 
Total Trust of Anti-Spyware 4.45 1.085 3.83 Programs 
IA! Likelihood of Use 4.83 1.466 4.20 
lA2 Prediction of Use 4.63 1.439 4.24 
IA3 Intention to Use 4.69 1.512 4.16 
IA4 
Recommending to 
4.57 1.607 3.78 Others 
IA5 Multiple Use 4.40 1.541 3.71 
Total Intention to Adopt Anti-
4.62 1.377 4.01 Spyware Programs 
Control variables: age, gender, major, and classification 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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1.350 19.855 .ooo••• 
1.290 70.783 .000*** 
1.291 35.830 .000*** 
1.249 66.674 .ooo••• 
l.278 60.624 .ooo••• 
1.283 51.270 .000*** 
1.120 63.608 .ooo••• 
1.509 39.193 .000*** 
1.495 18.051 .000*** 
1.517 31.236 .000*** 
1.475 60.179 .000*** 
1.627 39.843 .000*** 
1.330 46.657 .ooo••• 
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Appendix B: Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis (First Result) 
Factors (U.S.) Factors (South Korea) 
Jlem, Computer Internet Security Perceived Jlem, Computer Internet Security Perceived 
familiaritv Familiaritv Familiaritv Know- Risk Tru,t Intention familiaritv Familiaritv Familiarity Knowl,dg, Risk Tru,t Intention 
CF5 .812 .162 .222 .I I 1 .130 .126 .175 CF2 .817 .043 .217 .274 .094 .031 .010 
CF6 .791 .182 .305 .102 .128 .174 .142 CF3 .810 .073 .259 .239 .097 .083 -.024 
CF2 .766 .128 .302 .147 .059 .138 .158 CF4 .797 .125 .111 .078 .171 .108 .116 
CF3 .766 .103 .369 .085 .085 .134 .160 CF5 .792 .099 .168 .346 .163 .127 .037 
CF4 .766 .133 .220 .237 .093 .115 .147 CF6 .761 .168 .238 .299 .138 .143 .028 
CF8 .710 .246 .301 .083 .108 .145 .127 CFS .717 .270 .228 .184 .133 .166 .018 
CF! .649 .106 .282 .269 .047 .097 .112 CF! .697 .110 .139 -.055 -.019 .006 .178 
CF7 .£l2 -.042 .183 .324 .135 .123 .067 CF7 .122 -.189 .291 .423 .070 -.020 -.010 
IF6 .073 .870 .238 -.024 .081 .t14 .051 IF6 .074 .864 .105 -.077 .130 -.007 .101 
IF3 .076 .861 .167 .000 .077 .126 .092 IF3 .074 .850 .038 -.064 .no .048 .030 
IF2 .084 .830 .197 -.086 .115 .120 .099 IF4 .033 ,763 .133 .028 .025 .069 .105 
IF5 .077 .796 .117 .011 .138 .103 .067 IF2 .096 .729 .090 .002 .139 .153 .037 
IF! .237 .700 .050 .098 .069 .169 .104 IF! .241 .709 .005 .119 .105 .167 -.032 
IF4 .151 .651 .166 .134 .115 -.073 .033 IF5 .053 .704 .091 -.057 .154 -.059 .042 
SF7 .327 .138 .848 .173 .134 .091 .079 SF4 .255 .117 .881 ,163 .066 .098 .060 
SF2 .296 .224 .826 .150 .119 .090 .095 SF3 .273 .067 .844 .141 .121 ,038 .103 
SF3 .346 .176 .819 .199 .097 .079 .149 SF5 .286 .104 .835 .205 .080 .128 .087 
SF4 ,337 .171 .803 .239 .097 ,084 .125 SF7 .285 .135 .835 .171 .114 .102 .060 
SF! .172 .273 .791 .102 .095 .068 .086 SF6 .251 .158 .823 .178 .134 .097 .071 
SF5 .386 .179 .787 .178 .136 .124 .140 SF2 .032 .120 ,721 .217 .106 .082 .101 
SF6 .364 .229 .779 .133 .161 .123 .076 SF! .076 .111 .293 .218 .253 .189 .025 
KS3 .371 .000 .310 .665 .153 .137 .175 KS4 .283 .034 .239 .813 .190 .123 .123 
KS5 .423 .065 .399 .624 .184 .205 .235 KS5 .287 .044 .283 .766 .213 .124 .106 
KS2 .388 .082 .361 .613 .211 .163 .239 KS3 .253 -.130 .278 .697 .143 .094 .187 
KS! .358 .028 .389 .607 .109 .174 .184 KS2 .259 .101 .249 .687 .230 .150 .091 
KS4 .422 .061 .354 .607 .233 .180 .221 KS! .242 -.055 .173 .621 .118 .158 .315 
PRS2 .094 .103 .108 .115 .877 .196 .174 PRS3 .114 .108 .103 .088 .889 .046 .075 
PRS5 .043 .109 .065 .059 .869 .145 .178 PRS6 .100 .126 .no .118 .867 .IOS .138 
PRS3 .194 .132 .157 .095 .858 .208 .ISi PRS2 .146 .182 .057 .130 .856 .032 .112 
PRS6 .130 .157 .127 .039 .849 ,253 .179 PRS5 .093 .114 .136 .071 .839 .217 .085 
PRS4 .125 ,085 .170 .087 .831 .178 .138 PRS4 .091 .108 .141 .112 .838 .098 .147 
PRSI .054 .109 .055 .138 .808 .225 .164 PRSI .093 .211 .038 ,239 .706 .127 .133 
TA3 .156 .126 .138 .074 .190 .847 .184 TA3 .069 .105 .100 .081 .150 .836 .266 
TA4 .064 .053 .139 JOO .141 .821 .178 TA5 .032 .057 .084 .058 .057 .833 .259 
TA6 .122 .103 .062 .094 .194 .808 .316 TA4 .059 -.013 .112 .070 .041 .819 .152 
TA5 .128 .100 .053 .158 .207 .807 .245 TA2 .132 .131 .071 .104 .169 .811 .198 
TAI .192 .126 .062 .043 .250 .780 .142 TAI .108 .164 .022 .105 .135 .808 .137 
TA2 .208 .132 .092 .074 .289 .763 .186 TA6 .102 .021 .117 .104 .060 .791 .271 
IA3 .200 .119 .158 .152 .262 .273 .800 IA2 .123 .111 .033 .081 .203 .323 .843 
IA4 .241 .133 .148 .089 .242 .243 .776 IA3 .185 .119 .081 .112 .151 .322 .819 
IA2 .161 .138 .101 .133 .240 .335 .773 IA! .086 .162 .020 .123 .177 .335 .810 
IA5 .184 .03S .133 .153 .175 .229 .773 IA4 .083 -.008 .167 .092 .148 ,306 .793 





Factors (South Korea) 
Computer Internet Security Perceived Computer Internet Secwity Perceived 
familiaritv Familiaritv Familiaritv 
Knowledge 
Risk 
Thl,t Intention familiaritv Familiaritv Familiaritv Knowledge Risk Trust Intention 
CFS .809 .155 .226 .133 .134 .130 .173 CF2 .814 .028 .227 .275 .095 .028 .rm 
CF6 .190 .178 .300 .127 .133 .177 .140 CF3 .808 .059 .270 .242 .098 .080 -.027 
CF2 ,768 .124 .294 .174 .065 .141 .155 CF4 .799 .111 .119 .085 .171 .104 .114 
CF4 .764 .126 .214 .260 .098 .118 .146 CFS .794 .081 .177 .345 .164 .123 .036 
CF3 .763 .101 .369 .107 .090 .137 .160 CF6 ,763 .149 .247 .295 .140 .140 .030 
CFS .714 .242 .292 .110 .112 .148 .124 CFS .717 .258 .238 .185 .135 .165 .017 
CF! .646 .104 .268 ,285 .052 .099 .115 CF! .701 .099 .145 -.039 -.020 .003 .172 
1F6 .086 .875 .211 -.015 .081 .113 .OSI 1F6 .078 .868 .110 -.065 .135 -.001 .097 
lF3 .088 .865 .140 .010 .rm .126 .092 IF3 .082 .853 .045 -.047 .114 .053 .025 
lF2 .090 .836 .183 -.084 .115 .120 .102 IF4 .o3S .767 .138 .037 .030 .015 .103 
lFS .080 ,799 .103 .003 .138 .103 .073 IF2 .100 .730 .095 .005 .144 .ISB .038 
!Fl .249 .697 .024 .121 .072 .171 .097 IFS .OlO .714 .096 -.on .157 -.052 .035 
1F4 .152 .650 .163 .133 .116 -.072 .034 !Fl .253 .699 .011 .120 .109 .168 -.029 
SF7 .316 .154 .853 .182 .135 .092 .082 SF4 .247 .107 .885 .157 .069 .099 .059 
SF3 337 .193 .817 .211 .099 .080 .150 SF3 .265 .058 .849 .137 .123 .038 .102 
SF4 319 .186 .815 .243 .098 .085 .129 SFS .277 .096 .841 .208 .081 .129 .083 
SF2 .296 .241 .807 .169 .121 .091 .095 SF7 .278 .126 .840 .172 .116 .103 .051 
SFS .369 .194 .801 .182 .136 .125 .144 SF6 .244 .150 .828 .184 .135 .099 .066 
SF6 .353 .244 ,785 .140 .162 .124 .019 SF2 .033 .104 .721 .203 .108 .081 .107 
KS3 .350 -.001 .310 .669 .156 .140 .178 KS4 .279 .020 .248 .819 .192 .121 .117 
KSS .406 .064 .402 .640 .188 .208 .231 KSS .2&6 .026 .291 ,770 .214 .122 .101 
KS2 .376 .082 .352 .631 .215 .165 .235 KS3 .239 -.135 .286 ,700 .144 ,094 .180 
KS! .348 .030 .376 .626 .113 .176 .181 KS2 .260 .084 .257 .699 .231 .148 .084 
KS4 ,406 .060 .354 .622 .236 .183 .218 KS! .237 -.065 .180 .624 .119 .156 .310 
PRS2 .091 .103 .099 .120 .878 .197 .173 PRS3 .117 .098 .104 .0&6 .890 .046 .076 
PRSS .036 .110 .065 .056 .869 ,146 .180 PRS6 .096 .124 .113 .123 .868 .107 .135 
PRS3 .184 .133 .156 .094 .859 .209 .154 PRS2 .147 .176 .060 .134 .857 ,033 .110 
PRS6 .123 .158 .126 .040 .849 .254 .181 PRSS .0&8 .112 .138 .072 .840 .219 .0&4 
PRS4 .115 .087 .172 .086 .832 .179 .141 PRS4 .091 .099 .142 .111 .838 .098 .148 
PRSl .057 .108 .036 .ISi .810 .226 .160 PRSl .096 .201 .040 .238 .707 ,128 .134 
TA3 .157 .127 .126 .085 .191 .848 .182 TA3 .075 .097 .101 ,087 .150 .836 .265 
TA4 .066 .056 .121 .112 .142 .820 .176 TAS .028 .059 .084 .062 .058 .835 .258 
TAS .117 .099 .051 .153 .207 .808 ',248 .TA4 .052 -.008 .114 .075 .041 .822 .148 
TM .113 .104 .061 ,090 .193 .808 .320 TA2 .141 .118 .071 .102 .169 .810 ,202 
TA! ,184 .123 ,071 .041 .250 .781 .144 TM .106 .012 .117 .105 .060 .790 .272 
TA2 .196 .130 .105 .070 .288 .765 .188 TA! .114 .156 .023 .106 .136 .807 .139 
IA3 .195 .120 .153 .160 .262 .273 .800 IA2 .128 .106 .034 .085 .203 .321 .844 
IA4 .235 .135 .145 .092 .242 ,243 .779 IA3 .192 .110 .083 .114 .151 .319 .821 
IA5 .115 .036 .135 .151 .175 .229 .777 !Al .094 .155 .021 .130 .177 .333 .810 
IA2 .158 .138 .095 .140 .240 .336 .773 IA4 .081 -.009 .168 .093 .147 .306 .794 
!Al .188 .151 .111 .145 .238 .347 .767 IA5 -.085 .009 .1J5 .163 .060 .151 .660 
Extraction Method: Pnnc1pal Component Analysis. Rotat1on Method: Vanmax with Kaiser Nonnahzation (Both First and Second). 
Appendix C 
Technology familiarity and anti-spyware adoption 
0' Questions for Students -.., 
Thank you for participating in this study. This study is to examine your technology 
familiarity, awareness of spyware, and adoption of anti-spyware program. The results will 
be compared between the U.S. and South Korea. This study is being completed for master's 
thesis requirements by Dong-Heon Kwak of the Information Systems Department. 
The MSU IRB (the committee to protect people who serve as subjects in research) has 
approved this study (IRB#: 08-10-22). 
You must be at least 18 years of age to participate in this study. 
If you are under 18 years old, please stop. 
Please answer to each question that best applies to you. This survey is anonymous and 
results will be held in strict confidence. If you have any questions, please contact the 
researcher, Dong-Heon Kwak (606-207-2717, dhkwak01@morehead-st.edu) or the thesis 
chair, Dr. Donna Kizzier (606-783-2724, kizzierl234@earthlink.net). 
This study will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
Thank you for your cooperation in advance. 
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I. The following questions are related to your basic computer experience. Please answer each question 
by circling the best response or providing the information. 
I. Do you use anti-spyware program? (I) Yes (2)No (3) Not sure 
2. If you use anti-spyware program, how many programs do you use? 
(I) 1 (2) 2 (3) 3 (4) 4 (5) 5 or more (6) Not sure 
3. Which operating systems do you use? (circle all that apply) 
(I) Microsoft Windows XP (2) Microsoft Wmdows Vista (3) Mac OS (4) Linux 
(5) Solaris (6) Others (please identify) :. ____________ _ 
4. How much time do you spend using the computer per day excluding Internet use? 
(1) less than 1 hour 
(4) 3 up to 4 hours 
(2) 1 up to 2 hours 
(5) 4 up to 5 hours 
(3) 2 up to 3 hours 
( 6) more than 5 hours 
5. How much time do you spend browsing the Internet per day? 
(1) less than 1 hour (2) 1 up to 2 hours (3) 2 up to 3 hours 
(4) 3-up to 4 hours (5) 4-up to 5 hours (6) more than 5 hours 
II. The following questions are related to your technology familiarity, knowledge and perceived risk of 
s are, trust and intention to ado t anti-s ro ram. The exam le res onses follow: 
Num Example Question 
EX! I am familiar with online based survey. 
Num Example Question 




















6 I 7 
I. The following questions are computer familiarity-related. Please circle (0) the number that best applies 
tovou. 
Num Questions Strongly - Neutral - Strongly Disagree Agree 
CF! I keep up with the latest computer hardware. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CF2 
I am familiar with changing (installing/upgrading) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 comnuter hardware. 
CF3 I am familiar with computer hardware. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CF4 I keep up with the latest computer software. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CF5 
I am familiar with changing (installing/upgrading) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 comouter software. 
CF6 I am familiar with computer software. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CF7 I enjoy reading computer magazines. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CFS Overall, I am familiar with computers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
, CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE 17 
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2. The following questions are Internet familiarity-related. Please circle (0) the number that best applies to 
you 
Num Questions Strongly - Neutral - Strongly Disag,-ee Agree 
!Fl I am familiar with the use of search engines. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IF2 I am familiar with the use of e-mail. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IF3 I am familiar with searching information using the I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Internet 
IF4 I am familiar with purchasing products on the I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Internet. 
IF5 I am familiar with reading articles on the Internet. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IF6 Overall, I am familiar with the Internet. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The following questions are security familiarity-related. Please circle (0) the number that best applies to 
vou. 
Num Questions Strongly - Neutral - Strongly Disagree Agree 
SF! I am familiar with privacy violation issues on the I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Internet. 
SF2 I am familiar with technologies which protect people. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SF3 I am familiar with security technology. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SF4 I am familiar with information security. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SF5 I am familiar with computer security. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SF6 I am familiar with Internet security. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SF7 Overall, I am familiar with general security issues. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The following questions are knowledge of spyware-related. Please circle (0) the number that best applies 
to you. 
Num Questions Strongly 
Disagree - Neutral - Strongly Agree 
KS! I update news and developments about the spyware I 2 3 4 5 6 7 technolo_gv. 
KS2 I know about the problems of malicious software I 2 3 4 5 6 7 intruding Internet users' computers 
KS3 I seek advice on computer web sites or magazines 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 about anti-sovware products. 
KS4 I have knowledge of spyware problems and I 2 3 4 5 6 7 consequences. 
KS5 Overall, I have general knowledge of spyware. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE...-
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5. The following questions are perceived risk of spyware-related. Please circle (0) the number that best 
ann!ies to vou.' 
Num Questions Strongly - Neutral - Strongly Disa.,,.,., A.,.,., 
PRSl 
I believe that spyware causes significant harm to my 
comouter. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PRS2 
I believe that my computer is at risk if spyware is 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 downloaded. 
PRS3 
I believe that my personal information is at risk if 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 snvw:ire is downloaded. 
PRS4 
I am concerned about threat to my personal privacy 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 bvsn~are. 
PRS5 
I am worried about the threat to my computer by 
snvware. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PRS6 Overall, I believe that spyware is risky. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. The following questions are trust of anti-spyware program-related. Please circle (0) the number that 
b Ii est a ,n es to vou. 
Num Questions Strongly - Neutral - Strongly Dis,ioree A.,.,.,._ 
TAI Anti-spyware programs have the ability to remove 
sovware. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TA2 
Anti-spyware programs have the ability to protect me 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 from spvware. 
TA3 
Anti-spyware programs are fair in its conduct of 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 computer protection. 
TA4 
Anti-spyware programs consider its users' best 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 interest when workinv: ru,ainst sovware. 
TA5 
Anti-spyware programs make good-faith efforts to 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 address most user concerns. 
TA6 Overall, anti-spyware programs are trustworthy. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. The following questions are intention to adopt anti-spyware program-related. Please circle (0) the 
number that best applies to you 
Num Questions Strongly - Neutral - Strongly Disagree Agree 
!Al I am likely to use anti-spyware program. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IA2 I predict that I will adopt anti-spyware program. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IA3 
I intend to periodically use anti-spyware program to 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 orotect mv comouter from spvware. 
IA4 
I will recommend to others that they use anti-spyware 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 program. 
IA5 
I will use two or more anti-spyware programs if 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 helpfuJ. 
CONTINUE 10 NEXT PAGE w 
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8. The following questions are specific·features of spyware -related. Please circle (0) the number that best 
applies to you 
Never Fully Num Questions 
Heard - Neutral - Aware andKnow 
SFSI 
What is your knowledge that spyware can trace 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 kevstrokes? 
SFS2 
What is your knowledge that spyware can reside on 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 com outer? 
SFS3 
What is your knowledge that spyware can monitor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 surfin_g behavior? 
SFS4 
What is your knowledge that spyware can record 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 online transactions? 
SFS5 What is your knowledge that spyware can be used as 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 denial of service /DOS) attack? 
SFS6 What is your knowledge of how spyware is installed? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your responses to the following questions will be held in strict confidence and your anonymity will 
be protected. The following items will be reported only in composite form for analysis purposes. 
Individual responses cannot be singled out. 
III. The following is demographic questions. Please answer the each question by circling the best 
response or providing the information. 
I. What is your gender? (1) Male (2) Female 
2. What is your major? ( ) 
3. Your classification? (1) Freshman (2) Sophomore (3) Junior 
(4) Senior (5) Graduate (6) Others ( ) 
4. How old are you? ( ) 
5. Your citizenship? (I) U.S. (2) Others ( ) 
After finishing the survey, please put it in the envelope in front of the instructor. 
Thank you for your participation. 
Contact Information 
Dong-Heon Kwak (606-207-2717, dhkwakOl@morehead-st.edu) 
Thesis Chair, Dr. Donna Kizzier (606-783-2724, kizzier1234@earthlink.net) 
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~~1.!i!. 
~%~ (1-606-207-2717, dhkwak:Ol@morehead-st.edu) 
Dr. Donna Kizzier (606-783-2724, kizzier1234@earthlink.net) 
Principal Investigator/Researcher: 
/ 
Name[,,£onq-Heon Kwak, Donna Kizzier Title: Masters student 
Campus Address: ~3"'2"'0'--'C"'o,,,m=b.._s __________ _ Campus Phone: :,,6~026:,-2~0/..!.7c::--"'27,_1"-'7'--'-------
Department: Department of Information Systems 
Purpose: 
Title of Project/Course: From technology familiarity to anti-spyware program adoption: comparison ·between U.S. 
and South Korea 
Funding Source/Agency: A 
Period of Project/Course: From: 10/27/08 To: 10/26/09 
Protocol Review Number: .,,D,,B,:-;01,,0,::-~2,.,,2,_ ___ _ 
Initial Review X Continuing Review __ 
The human subject use protocol described above has been reviewed by the MSU Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Human Subjects In Research with the following results: 
Yes " No □ 
10/27/08 
10/27 /08 - 10/26/09 
Yes □ No □ N/A " 
Yes " No □ NIA □ 




/ . ~ 
; 
Approved, may proceed as written 
Approval Period 
Approval for Continuing Review must be received prior to date sho)'ln 
Regulatory requirements have been met for the waiver of informed consent 
Regulatory requirements have been met for the waiver of documentation of consent 
Criteria for use of children, prisoners, pregnant women has been met 
Date: -'/'-"'¥/2_,;;,~2,,.4,_0:ce:... ____ _ 
7 7 
•lease refer to the protocol review number Jn·any future references to this protocol. Principal investigators of research projects 
vlth durations of more than one year should submit yearly to the !RB completed Form H; If any revisions are made to a project 
,r if any unforeseen risks arise during an Investigation, the principal Investigator must submit Form H'to the !RB, fully explaining 
II changes or unexpected risks; upon completion or termination of a research project, principal investigators must again submit 
Orm H. 
